Michigan Journal of International Law
Volume 36

Issue 3

2015

Uncertainty, Precaution, and Adaptive Management in Wildlife
Trade
Annecoos Wiersema
University of Denver Sturm College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil
Part of the Animal Law Commons, International Trade Law Commons, and the Natural Resources Law
Commons

Recommended Citation
Annecoos Wiersema, Uncertainty, Precaution, and Adaptive Management in Wildlife Trade, 36 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 375 (2015).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol36/iss3/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

ARTICLES

UNCERTAINTY, PRECAUTION, AND ADAPTIVE
MANAGEMENT IN WILDLIFE TRADE
Annecoos Wiersema*
I. UNCERTAINTY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Sources of Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Current Data Gaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Historical Data Gaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Variables and Complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Indeterminacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Uncertainty in Wildlife Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. MANAGING UNCERTAINTY: PRECAUTION AND
ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. The Precautionary Principle and Precautionary
Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Precaution as Procedure: Risk Assessment, CostBenefit Analysis, and Environmental Impact
Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Precaution within Adaptive Management . . . . . . . . . . . .
D. Analysis and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III. MANAGING UNCERTAINTY WITHIN CITES . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Structure of CITES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Precaution and Monitoring in the Listing Criteria . . . .
C. Adaptive Management for Non-Detriment Findings . .
D. Listing and Trade Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Appendix II Listing of Shark Species . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Polar Bear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Elephants, MIKE, and Ivory Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
E. Analysis and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV. A DUAL ROLE FOR PRECAUTION IN WILDLIFE TRADE:
PROCEDURE AND SUBSTANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Precaution in Adaptive Management: A Procedural
Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Precaution as a Substantive Decision-Making Tool . . .
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

378
378
380
381
382
382
383
388
388

391
393
394
395
395
399
403
407
408
412
415
417
418
419
420
423

*
Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I am grateful to
Fred Cheever, Alan Chen, Lorna McGregor, Viva Moffat, Justin Pidot, Rock Pring, Nantiya
Ruan, Joyce Sterling, Eli Wald, Andrew Wetzler, and Chris Wold for their helpful comments.
I owe sincere thanks to Alexandra Chinenova, Alexandra Jennings, Jamie Crawford, Katie
McAuley, and Jaime Menegus for their excellent research assistance.

375

376

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 36:375

INTRODUCTION
Wildlife trade is big business. Legal international trade in just some of
the wild animals and plants traded worldwide is estimated at $350 to $530
million per year.1 The United States is the primary importer of virtually
every major taxon of these species, including mammals, reptiles, fish, and
plants.2 When it comes to illegal trade, estimates of its value range from $7
to $23 billion annually, covering wild animals, fish, and timber.3 This illegal trade fuels organized crime and militia and terrorist groups.4 In the
face of all this pressure, some wild species appear to be traded in sustainable amounts. Others are headed for extinction.
In this high-stakes world, both uncertainty and value conflicts abound.
With scientific and socioeconomic uncertainty, data, inferences, and predictions can all be contested. The Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) manages international trade in wild at-risk species and their parts through a combination of
international decision-making and national and sub-national implementation, banning and regulating trade in species with the goal of avoiding extinction due to international trade.5 Every decision taken by CITES
parties—whether on the floor of the regular meetings or by Scientific Authorities designated by the state—has to deal with uncertainty due to data
gaps, the effect of human activity, and complexity, among other things.6
This Article addresses how the parties to CITES have dealt with uncertainty by analyzing their approach to precaution and adaptive management. The Article concludes that the parties have shied away from
adopting the precautionary principle or approach and have instead incorporated any precautionary elements into monitoring and adaptive management. This way of implementing precaution emphasizes uncertainty
1.
U.N. Env’t Programme World Conserv. Monitoring Ctr., CITES Trade: Recent
Trends in International Trade in Appendix II-Listed Species, at 4, SC62 Inf. 7 (July 23-27,
2012) [hereinafter CITES Trade]. This estimate covers only trade in species listed on Appendix II of CITES because trade in their parts needs to be monitored to ensure survival and
does not even cover trade in species that are not considered at risk. Id.
2.
Id. at 12, 17, 20, 22, 24, and 29.
3.
U.N. Env’t Programme and GRID-Arendal, The Environmental Crime Crisis –
Threats to Sustainable Development from Illegal Exploitation and Trade in Wildlife and Forest
Resources, at 23, (June 24, 2014) [hereinafter The Environmental Crime Crisis], available at
http://www.unep.org/unea/docs/rracrimecrisis.pdf.
4.
The Environmental Crime Crisis, supra note 3, at 8, 78–79. Concern about illegal
wildlife trade reaches the highest levels of government around the world, and has been addressed by the United Nations Security Council. See London Conference on the Illegal Wildlife Trade 2014, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/illegal-wildlife-trade2014; S.C. Res. 2134, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2134 (Jan. 28, 2014); S.C. Res. 2136, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/2136 (Jan. 30, 2014).
5.
Convention on Int’l Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3,
1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087 [hereinafter CITES].
6.
See Matthew J. Smith et al., Assessing the Impacts of International Trade on
CITES-Listed Species: Current Practices and Opportunities for Scientific Research, 144 BIOLOGICAL CONSERV. 82, 84 (2011) (observing that, for many CITES-listed species, decisions
on whether to grant an export permit will not be straightforward).
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arising from data gaps. However, uncertainty also arises from complexity
and indeterminacy, and cannot always be resolved by more data. Thus,
uncertainty is not always temporary. For the parties to ensure that international trade does not result in species extinction, they need to be informed
by science and aware of its limitations.7 Incorporating precaution within
adaptive management is therefore necessary for decision-making on wildlife trade, but it is not sufficient. The Article argues that fully acknowledging the range of sources of uncertainty requires both a first role for
precaution within adaptive management approaches—as the parties are
doing, albeit less explicitly—and a second role for precaution at the point
of final decision-making.
Part I describes various sources of uncertainty in conservation, with a
particular focus on uncertainty in the context of wildlife trade. Part II discusses the precautionary principle and precautionary approach developed
in legal circles to address uncertainty. It introduces the criticisms of the
precautionary principle or approach and discusses responses to those criticisms. Part II also introduces adaptive management and monitoring as one
approach that is increasingly significant in conservation circles as a way to
incorporate precaution but cabin it within scientific processes.
Part III of the Article analyzes how the parties to CITES have addressed uncertainty, precaution, and adaptive management in the context
of key aspects of the treaty: listing criteria and non-detriment-findings.
Part III also analyzes debates surrounding some significant species discussed at recent Conferences of the Parties (CoPs): sharks, polar bears,
and elephants. The CITES parties’ preference for monitoring and information-gathering over explicit references to precaution is evident in each
of these contexts.
In Part IV, the Article develops a two-part role for precaution in decision-making about wildlife trade. First, precaution should play an explicit
role in adaptive management and scientific decision-making—a procedural role. This is consistent with the approach many commentators have
developed and the emphasis the parties have placed on adaptive management. Second, precaution can and should play a supplementary role when
the science has reached its limits—a substantive role. Although some commentators and parties to CITES seem to consider this risky in that it could
allow non-scientific values to override science, their concerns do not take
account of the fact that science cannot resolve every question the parties
will face regarding wildlife trade. The Article sets out a strategy that is
both linked to science and can supplement it, without undermining or
overriding that science.
Because this Article views monitoring and precaution as complementary tools for conservation, listing on the CITES appendices is presented
as a positive step for most species. Listing allows for both monitoring and
precaution. This is discussed further in Part IV of the Article. Some parties
7.

See JACQUELINE PEEL, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN PRACTICE: ENVIRONDECISION-MAKING AND SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY 10 (2005) (arguing for decisionmaking processes that “neither [abandon] science entirely, nor [embrace] it uncritically”).
MENTAL
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and commentators will always resist more listing on CITES appendices
and many of the value disputes between CITES parties revolve around
whether listing on the appendices is good or bad. This is a false dichotomy.
A proper understanding of the role of listing as a mechanism to assist science-based and precautionary decision-making allows for listing to play an
important role in CITES.
The complex mix of uncertainty and value debates evident in wildlife
trade decision-making is not unique. It is replicated across conservation
and natural resource management decisions at every level of governance
and in every region of the world. Understanding how decision makers can
navigate this complexity and uncertainty within the field of wildlife trade
also sheds light on principles for decision-making for conservationists and
natural resource managers everywhere.
I.

UNCERTAINTY

A. Sources of Uncertainty
Ecological systems are complex, and uncertainty abounds.8 Much of
this stems from the nonlinear and dynamic nature of ecological systems.9
Since the 1970s, ecologists and conservation biologists have urged recognition that, contrary to the standard narratives that appeared to inform conservation science, policy, and law, the notion of balanced nature and a goal
of maintaining nature’s own static equilibrium were misplaced.10 Instead,
commentators urged the conservation community to recognize that nature
is far more complex and unpredictable. The natural world is made up of
processes and connections in constant flux with no predetermined fixed
outcome.11 As Holling put it, we are dealing with “complex, nonlinear systems where discontinuous behavior and structural change are the norm.”12
Among the lessons Holling, Walters, and others sought to convey were
aspects of the complexity of natural systems that should have, they argued,
8.
KARLINE SOETAERT & PETER M.J. HERMAN, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ECOLOGIMODELING: USING R AS A SIMULATION PLATFORM 1 (2009); M. HENRY H. STEVENS, A
PRIMER OF ECOLOGY WITH R 3–4 (2009); PEEL, supra note 7, at 43.
9.
See generally C.S. Holling, What Barriers? What Bridges?, in BARRIERS AND
BRIDGES TO THE RENEWAL OF ECOSYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS 3 (Lance H. Gunderson, C.S.
Holling & Stephen S. Light eds., 1995) (discussing the dynamic nature of ecological systems).
10.
See Holling, supra note 9, at 14–16; DANIEL BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A
NEW ECOLOGY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 3 (1990); CARL WALTERS, ADAPTIVE
MANAGEMENT OF RENEWABLE RESOURCES 1 (1986); RICHARD O. BROOKS, ROSS JONES, &
ROSS A. VIRGINIA, LAW AND ECOLOGY: THE RISE OF THE ECOSYSTEM REGIME 127 (2002);
J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to Clean Up
the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 933 (1997)
(discussing the equilibrium theory from different perspectives); A. Dan Tarlock, Slouching
Toward Eden: The Eco-Pragmatic Challenges of Ecosystem Revival, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1173,
1174–1175 (2003); Annecoos Wiersema, A Train Without Tracks: Rethinking the Place of
Law and Goals in Environmental and Natural Resources Law, 38 ENVTL. L. 1239, 1246 (2008)
[hereinafter Wiersema, Train Without Tracks].
11.
See Holling, supra note 9, at 3, 19.
12.
Id.
CAL
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significant effects on the way natural resource managers approached the
work of conservation.13
In addition, a key aspect of work by these ecologists is recognition that
humans and nature are not distinct. Humans are part of the ecosystem.14
They are “ecosystem components.”15 As a result, conservationists cannot
afford to approach their work without recognizing the potential impact of
social and economic forces, and without recognizing the myriad ways in
which human activity affects nature indirectly as well as directly. Otherwise, they run the risk that policies could fail due to unanticipated human
activity.16
Recognizing these aspects of natural systems can lead us to recognize
different sources of uncertainty. The source of uncertainty in turn, can inform how decision makers should deal with that uncertainty. While policymakers for conservation and natural resources management generally
understand that their decisions are made under conditions of uncertainty,17 their assumption about the nature of the source of uncertainty is
often barely articulated, even though it is often key to how these decision
makers will respond to it. Thus, this Section discusses the sources of uncertainty of most relevance to decision-making for biological conservation
generally and wildlife trade particularly.
The discussion below is informed by more general and complete discussions and typologies of uncertainty in environmental and health regulation. In particular, Peel’s focus on three categories of uncertainty within
science is highly informative: epistemological uncertainty, methodological
13.
See Bradley Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity,
and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189 (2002) (discussing the natural systems’ effects on how
natural resources managers approach conservation); Wiersema, Train Without Tracks, supra
note 10, at 1248–1253.
14.
Norman L. Christensen, Jr. & Jerry F. Franklin, Ecosystem Function and Ecosystem Management, in ECOSYSTEM FUNCTION AND HUMAN ACTIVITIES: RECONCILING ECONOMICS AND ECOLOGY 1, 17 (R. David Sampson & Norman L. Christensen, Jr. eds.,1997);
Stephen S. Light, Lance H. Gunderson & C.S. Holling, The Everglades: Evolution of Management in a Turbuluent Ecosystem, in BARRIERS AND BRIDGES TO THE RENEWAL OF ECOSYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS supra note 9, at 103, 151–154; R. Edward Grumbine, Reflections
on “What is Ecosystem Management?,” 11 CONSERV. BIOLOGY 41, 45 (1997); R. Edward
Grumbine, What is Ecosystem Management?, 8 CONSERV. BIOLOGY 27, 31 (1994).
15.

Christensen and Franklin, supra note 14, at 17.

16.

WALTERS, supra note 10, at 49–50.

17.
See Holly Doremus, Adaptation and Resiliency in Legal Systems: Adaptive Management as an Information Problem, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1455, 1462 (2011) [hereinafter
Doremus, Information Problem] (describing the view that natural resource management decisions “must typically be made in the face of incomplete knowledge about the systems being
managed” as common ground); Holly Doremus, Symposium, Of Salmon, the Sound, and the
Shifting Sands of Environmental Law—A National Perspective: Essay: Precaution, Science,
and Learning While Doing in Natural Resource Management, 82 WASH. L. REV. 547, 548
(2007) [hereinafter Doremus, Precaution, Science and Learning] (describing uncertainty as
the “unifying hallmark” of environmental and natural resource regulation); Michael C.
Runge, An Introduction to Adaptive Management for Threatened and Endangered Species, 2
J. OF FISH AND WILDLIFE MGMT. 220, 223–24 (2011).
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uncertainty, and sociological uncertainty.18 The first of these, ‘epistemological uncertainty,’ describes the uncertainty that arises from incomplete
scientific knowledge of natural processes and phenomena.19 ‘Methodological uncertainty’ refers to the uncertainty that stems from methods used to
collect and analyze data, including due to lack of adequate techniques
within science.20 Peel uses the term ‘sociological uncertainty’ to refer to
the scientific community’s practices that determine what science is considered to be recognizable as “certified ‘scientific knowledge’.”21 Peel’s forms
of scientific uncertainty play a role in the uncertainties I describe below,
although I do not elaborate on them explicitly here.
Typologies can break down uncertainty based on whether it arises
from information gaps, similar to Peel’s epistemological uncertainty,22 the
absence of baseline data,23 lack of knowledge about future events, including the impact of regulatory interventions,24 and the interaction of the
variables at play in these complex ecological systems.25 These forms—or
more accurately, sources—of uncertainty can be elaborated in the context
of wildlife trade and wildlife conservation and grouped into the following
four types of uncertainty that will be relevant for discussion throughout
this Article.
1. Current Data Gaps
Uncertainty in the context of wildlife trade frequently arises from data
gaps. This is information that scientists have not been able to gather either
because existing technologies do not allow it or because resources or capacity have been limited.26 This problem pervades wildlife biology generally, and not just the context of wildlife trade. Data on population size and
range, habitat requirements, and other basic biological information is frequently lacking.27 Indeed, these data gaps can exist for whole populations
of even the most prominent species.28 Even if taxonomic and distribution
data is available, other critical information for the purposes of determining
18.
PEEL, supra note 7, at 42–47.
19.
Id. at 43–44.
20.
Id. at 44–46.
21.
Id. at 46.
22.
Id., at 43-44 (epistemological uncertainty); Doremus, Information Problem, supra
note 17, at 1471.
23.
PEEL, supra note 7at 42–43; Doremus, Information Problem, supra note 17, at
1475.
24.
Doremus, Information Problem, supra note 17, at 1471-72.
25.
Id. at 1474–75.
26.
See PEEL, supra note 7, at 44–46 (As Peel indicates, this source of uncertainty
straddles her epistemological and methodological uncertainties).
27.
Doremus, Information Problem, supra note 17, at 1468.
28.
The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species does not have full assessments of all
species. See Int’l Union for Conservation of Nature, Overview of the IUCN Red List, THE
IUCN RED LIST OF THREATENED SPECIES, http://www.iucnredlist.org/about/overview#ex
panding_coverage (last visited Feb. 20, 2015).
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the effect of trade on species that are subject to either legal or illegal trade
is missing, such as population demography and responses to harvesting
and use.29 In addition, data about the volume of international trade in wild
animals and plants is incomplete.30
This source of uncertainty, arising from data gaps, is characterized by
the sense that the uncertainty is temporary. In many cases, it is.31 Given
sufficient effort, resources, and time, the implicit assumption may be that
the data gaps will increasingly be filled. Policy-makers should, in turn, respond by advocating more scientific research. They might also put in place
temporary protective measures to avoid irreversible consequences while
they seek more data.
2. Historical Data Gaps
Uncertainty also arises because of information gaps that we know exist, but that cannot be fully corrected. This is often a product of time, either past or future. With regard to the past, scientists lack historical
baseline data for many species.32 Scientists and historians can make attempts to reconstruct information from various sources, including fossil
research and historical accounts, but they will never be fully certain of the
baseline information. Of course, baseline data cannot itself resolve all uncertainty, because without a natural state of equilibrium in nature, the
choice of what to treat as the baseline is also significant.33 Nevertheless, in
some cases, data that has remained relatively constant over extensive periods of time can be used as a baseline without difficult value decisions.
Historical data gaps can have a significant effect on interpretation of
current data. For example, in the case of the polar bear, the lack of historical data has led to competing narratives of whether polar bear numbers
have gone up in recent decades and how adaptable polar bears are in the
face of ecological change.34

29.
Smith et al., supra note 6, at 82, 85 (noting that there appears to be very little peerreviewed literature on population demography, responses to harvesting, or sustainable use of
CITES-listed species).
30.

See CITES Trade, supra note 1.

31.
The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species has increased dramatically the number
of species it has fully assessed. See Int’l Union for Conservation of Nature, Summary Statistics, THE IUCN RED LIST OF THREATENED SPECIES, http://www.iucnredlist.org/about/sum
mary-statistics#Expanding_Red_List (last visited Feb. 20, 2015). See also Natalie Angier, Our
Understanding of Giraffes Does Not Measure Up, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 2014, at D1 (describing
the lack of scientific research and therefore lack of knowledge about giraffes).
32.

Doremus, Information Problem, supra note 17, at 1475–76.

33.
See Daniel B. Botkin, Adjusting Law to Nature’s Discordant Harmonies, 7 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 25, 29–31 (1996) (describing the effect of humans on what we think of
as natural).
34.

See infra notes 40, 60–61 and accompanying text.
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3. Variables and Complexity
Ecological systems are complex systems. Complexity breeds uncertainty because complex systems are connected in so many ways and affected by so many variables that those studying the system can never gain
a full understanding of how any single variable will respond.35 Further,
because humans are part of ecological systems, the variables that contribute to complexity are not limited to apparently natural phenomena. They
include socioeconomic variables.
In part, this is a current data gap and can be, to a limited extent, remedied by more information and better modeling. However, complexity
makes developing a full picture of the system ultimately impossible. It also
exacerbates uncertainty arising from data gaps. Scientists’ ability to learn
in an area with known information gaps may be hampered by their lack of
understanding of how that area is connected to another area. It can, therefore, affect how scientists structure experiments, demonstrated by Peel’s
discussion of methodological uncertainty.36
4. Indeterminacy
Ecologists understand ecological systems to be in a constant state of
flux.37 They are stochastic systems, subject to randomness. There is also no
state of equilibrium to which they will return if ‘left alone’ by humans.
Uncertainty arising from indeterminacy is closely related to the
problems of complexity and variability.38 In some ways, it is the most intractable because it arises not from a lack of information, but from a lack
of any determinate end-point. This adds to complexity, because if systems
are operating along non-linear paths they may interact with each other
and behave internally in ways that would not have been predicted by extrapolating from data in a linear fashion. Models, discussed further below,
can build in probabilities and identify the level of confidence in their predictions but, again, cannot provide absolute certainty.
Indeterminacy adds to uncertainty in another very concrete way for
decision makers. Because ecological systems do not have their own state
of equilibrium, decision makers will sometimes have to choose the environmental condition they want to maintain. Science cannot provide the
answer, beyond advocating maintenance of ‘ecological integrity’.39 As a
result, decision makers must make value judgments, both in the sense of
35.
STEVENS, supra note 8, at 4 (describing the myriad potential interactions within
ecosystems). See also PEEL, supra note 7, at 37 (describing the problem of generalizing between data sets because of variability).
36.
PEEL, supra note 7, at 45.
37.
See Holling, supra note 9, at 19.
38.
In a complex system with an equilibrium state, resolving the uncertainty arising
from complexity would require grappling with all the variables but could still lead to a determinable endpoint. In systems that lack an endpoint, the uncertainty becomes more
intractable.
39.
For difficulties defining this term and more discussion on this, see Wiersema, Train
Without Tracks, supra note 10.
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which goal they are seeking to achieve and in the sense of which values
they wish to accommodate in meeting that goal.
B. Uncertainty in Wildlife Trade
Uncertainty abounds in wildlife trade. This uncertainty ranges from
data gaps to problems of complexity and indeterminacy, and results in
contested information that can be heavily informed by value preferences.
For example, the parties to CITES have spent time debating trade in polar
bears, sharks, and ivory. All four types of uncertainty appear in these
debates.
In the case of the polar bear, in spite of some knowledge and some
scientific consensus, uncertainty remains. Sources of uncertainty include
current and historic data gaps. Polar bear research did not begin until the
1960s, so there are no reliable population numbers before that time. This
in turn has led to persistent, albeit unreliable, claims that populations of
polar bears have increased in recent decades.40 Even after some decades
of scientific study, data is currently missing for almost half of the subpopulations of polar bears. This current data gap also informs views of population dynamics. For example, reports from Inuit hunters that they were
seeing more bears in the mid-2000s led to a belief by some communities
that polar bear numbers were increasing. However, some scientists argued
that the increase in polar bear sightings was more likely related to sea ice
changes due to climate warming, with polar bears increasing their time
near human settlements because the ice they would traditionally be spending time on has diminished due to melting.41
Information gaps exist for many other species, including species regulated by CITES.42 Indeed, more is known about polar bears than about
many other species. Absence of data is significant in the study of oceanic
sharks, many of which have been the subject of discussion at CITES’s

40.
Peter Dykstra, Magic Number: A Sketchy “Fact” About Polar Bears Keeps Going
. . . and Going . . . and Going, SOC’Y OF ENVTL. JOURNALISTS J. (2008), available at http://
www.sejarchive.org/pub/SEJournal_Excerpts_Su08.htm.
41.
See Eric V. Regehr et al., Effects of Earlier Sea Ice Breakup on Survival and Population Size of Polar Bears in Western Hudson Bay, 71 J. OF WILDLIFE MGMT. 2673, 2680–81
(2007); Ian Stirling & Claire L. Parkinson, Possible Effects of Climate Warming on Selected
Populations of Polar Bears (Ursus Maritimus) in the Canadian Arctic, 59 ARCTIC 262, 262–63,
271–72 (2006); Martina Tyrrell, More Bears, Less Bears: Inuit and Scientific Perceptions of
Polar Bear Populations on the West Coast of Hudson Bay, 30 ÉTUDES/INUIT/STUD. 191,
198–99 (2006); Martina Tyrrell and Douglas A. Clark, What Happened to Climate Change?
CITES and the Reconfiguration of Polar Bear Conservation Discourse, 24 GLOBAL ENVTL.
CHANGE 363, 364 (2014).
42.

Smith et al., supra note 6 at 85–86.
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CoPs.43 Very little is known, for example, about porbeagle shark spatial
ecology, movement, and habitat preference.44
With regard to the ivory trade, even with robust efforts and international support for data collection, lack of data still hampers full certainty
on elephant populations. The most comprehensive assessment of African
elephants, prepared at the direction of the parties to CITES by the IUCN/
SSN African Elephant Specialist Group covers only thirty to forty percent
of the elephant population, with the status and reliability of information
varying by region.45 Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants, MIKE,
has contributed greatly to information on poaching, but the system is also
rife with information gaps.46
Resolving these data gaps is in part a question of putting more resources into research, although historical data gaps cannot be fully remedied. Counting polar bears, although easier than counting many other
species, involves certain logistical difficulties, making it unlikely that all
data gaps can be remedied this way.47 For sharks, some uncertainty can be
remedied by directing resources to studying the species, and by using new
technology like satellite tracking technology.48 This will take time, and is
unlikely to result in complete information, but would be helpful to conservation efforts. Nevertheless, significant barriers exist to the collection of
additional information on sharks, including the difficulty of gaining information from illegal fishing, and problems of capacity.49 Where countries
rely on catch landing information, the data could be wrong for many reasons.50 Data collection is complicated by problems in identification of fins
and the lack of species-specific reporting.51
43.
Shelley C. Clarke et al., Population Trends in Pacific Oceanic Sharks and the Utility of Regulations on Shark Finning, 27 CONSERV. BIOLOGY 197 (2012); U.N. Food and Agric.
Org. [FAO], Technical Workshop on the Status, Limitations and Opportunities for Improving
Monitoring of Shark Fisheries and Trade: Advance Copy, Nov. 3-6, 2008, at 7–10, Fisheries
and Aquaculture Rep. No. 897 (2009) [hereinafter FAO, Technical Workshop on Shark Fisheries and Trade] (presented at CITES’s Animal Commitee’s 24th Meeting), available at http:/
/cites.org/sites/default/files/common/com/ac/24/EFS24i-06.pdf.
44.
Nicolas G. Pade et al., First Results from Satellite-Linked Archival Tagging of Porbeagle Shark, Lamna Nasus: Area Fidelity, Wider-Scale Movements and Plasticity in Diel
Depth Changes, 370 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL MARINE BIOLOGY & ECOLOGY 64, 65 (2009);
Ryan A. Saunders, François Royer, & Maurice W. Clark, Winter Migration and Diving Behavior of Porbeagle Shark, Lamna Nasus, in the Northeast Atlantic, 68 ICES J. OF MARINE
SCI. 166 (2011).
45.
See CITES, 65th Meeting of the Standing Comm., Elephant Conservation, Illegal
Killing and Ivory Trade, Geneva, Switz., July 7–11, 2014, SC65 Doc. 42.1, at 14, available at
http://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/com/sc/65/E-SC65-42-01_2.pdf.
46.

See id. (describing information gaps with regard to elephant populations).

47.
See generally PETER LOURIE, THE POLAR BEAR SCIENTISTS (2012) (describing the
work of the polar bear scientists and the challenges they face counting polar bears).
48.

See Pade et al., supra note 44 at 72–72.

49.

FAO, Technical Workshop on Shark Fisheries and Trade, supra note 43, at 7.

50.

Id. at 7, 11–12.

51.

Id. at 10.
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Even if these information gaps could be addressed, questions about
these species are still affected by uncertainty arising from the interplay of
a number of variables. For example, for polar bears, the interaction of
climate change with polar bear population viability may also be complicated by the impact of climate change on other species, such as the ringed
seal, and the cumulative effects of behavioral changes by polar bears that
could increase human-polar bear interactions. The scientists who study polar bears are in broad agreement that polar bear numbers are currently not
in decline, but that sea ice loss—projected by climate scientists—will likely
have an impact on populations.52 Yet the overall vulnerability of the polar
bear to climate change will depend on a number of variables regarding
climate change, other species, and polar bear adaptability.53 Thus, even
though scientists agree that the polar bear is vulnerable to habitat change
and that climate change is causing and will continue to cause that habitat
change, uncertainty remains.54 Similarly sharks, as climate change affects
ocean temperatures, may be affected both directly and indirectly.
Information gaps about levels of trade55 in shark and elephant parts—
indeed, all wildlife trade—are also exacerbated by socio-economic variables and the uncertainty arising from the indeterminacy of demand, migration of people, and market dynamics. Elephant populations and levels
of poaching are affected by physical habitat changes and by factors such as
war and trade routes. Indeed, demand for illegal wildlife appears to be
fueled currently by wealth, rather than traditional medicines, adding a new
set of variables to predictions about levels of trade.56 Variables concerning
proposals to legalize trade in ivory and rhino horn and the effects of that
trade on poaching levels include many questions. For example, it is unknown whether demand will increase in response to legalization, how illegal traders will respond, and whether buyers will see parts of captive-bred
or raised animals as substitutable for wild-caught specimens.57 In addition,
52.
See, e.g., TANYA SHADBOLT, GEOFF YORK, & ERNEST W.T. COOPER, ICON ON ICE:
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND MANAGEMENT OF POLAR BEARS 5 (2012) (noting that all polar
bear range states agree that the greatest threat to the polar bear is climate change and its
impact on their habitat); Andrew E. Derocher, Nicholas J. Lunn, and Ian Stirling, Polar
Bears in a Warming Climate, 44 CONSERV. BIOLOGY 163, 166 (2004); Christine M. Hunter et
al., Climate Change Threatens Polar Bear Populations: A Stochastic Demographic Analysis,
91 ECOLOGY 2883 (2010); Tyrrell & Clark, supra note 41, at 364 (describing the consensus
about the nature of threats to polar bears, even though the status and trends of polar bear
populations is contested).
53.
See Derocher, Lunn, & Stirling, supra note 52 (outlining some of the variables that
could affect polar bear populations).
54.
See Tyrrell & Clark, supra note 41, at 364 (noting that the status and trends of
polar bear populations is contested).
55.
SHADBOLT, YORK, & COOPER, supra note 52, at 4.
56.
See Press Release, CITES, CITES Meets as ‘Wealth’ is Replacing ‘Health’ as a
Driver of Wildlife Consumption, July 4, 2014, available at http://www.cites.org/eng/
CITES_SC65_wealth_replacing_health_as_driver_of_wildlife_consumption.
57.
See Annecoos Wiersema, Uncertainty and Markets for Endangered Species Under
CITES, 22 REV. OF EUR., COMP. & INT’L. ENVTL. L. 239, 242 (2013) [hereinafter Wiersema,
Uncertainty and Markets].
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biological questions remain unanswered, such as questions about how rhinos would respond to having their horns harvested.
To account for these variables, scientists have developed complex
models that allow them to translate the data into predictions.58 These
models cannot provide certainty, as discussed further below, but could
provide enough of a basis for regulatory response. However, local communities often do not agree with all of the scientists’ predictions.59 Not only
do communities dispute scientific estimates of the number of polar bears,
but they also dispute how adaptable polar bears will be and whether they
are likely to be able to survive the effects of climate change.60 Scientists
are still unclear on exactly when polar bears separated from their brown
bear ancestors, leading to disputes about whether they may have survived
previous warm periods.61
These variables give rise to a deeper layer of uncertainty because they
affect not only predictive capacity, but also affect how new data is interpreted. In the case of poaching of elephants, despite the fact that there is
full agreement that poaching has gone up since the last legally sanctioned
sale of ivory, experts do not agree on whether that increase in poaching is
connected to the sale.62
It should go without saying that one way to address lack of knowledge
is to conduct additional research. As Smith and his coauthors note, channeling more funds toward research that is targeted to answer particular
questions can increase the amount of relevant knowledge available to
scientists and policy makers.63 However, simply seeking additional information will not address much of the uncertainty discussed above.
First, policy responses may be needed before the research is available.
This can be significant for conservation, where the risk of extinction is at
play. Second, much of the uncertainty discussed above cannot be fully addressed even with more information. More information is certainly important, for example when trying to reconstruct historical baselines or account
for variables, but the complexity of the system is such that it would be
58.

See, e.g., Regehr et al., supra note 41 at 2674; Lourie, supra note 47, at 48–49.

59.

See Martina Tyrrell, West Hudson Bay Polar Bears: The Inuit Perspective, in INUIT,
POLAR BEARS AND SUSTAINABLE USE: LOCAL, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 95, 98–101 (M.M.R. Freeman and Lee Foote eds., 2009) [hereinafter Tyrell, West Hudson Bay Polar Bears] (describing the view of Arviarmiut that polar bear numbers are
increasing).
60.
Government of Nunavut, Response to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s Proposed
Rule to List the Polar Bear as Threatened Throughout its Range, in INUIT, POLAR BEARS AND
SUSTAINABLE USE: LOCAL, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 59, at
153, 155–161 (questioning the methodology and conclusions of scientific studies that have
projected that polar bears will be endangered or extinct within three generations due to climate-induced reduction in sea ice). See also id. at 156 (arguing that polar bears can survive
and flourish in areas that have an ice-free season); id. at 157–158 (discussing alternative explanations for polar bear population numbers).
61.

LOURIE, supra note 47, at 74.

62.

See sources cited infra note 229.

63.

Smith et al., supra note 6, at 83.
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impossible to know everything with absolute certainty. The uncertainty
that remains is a predictive uncertainty. We will never have quite enough
information to predict fully what will happen next.
Ecological modeling, a form of applied mathematics, can facilitate
some understanding in the face of complexity because it allows abstractions “to highlight the relevant aspects of complex phenomena.”64 The
very act of abstraction and simplification necessary for developing models
allows for a spotlight on the key features of ecological systems, which in
turn allows for prediction, explanation, and generalization.65 Ecological
modelers use the example of a map, which is a simplified model of an area.
The map allows a viewer to focus on the feature they are most interested
in—depending on the map, it could be a road or a border.66 Without that
simplification and spotlight, scientists would be overwhelmed by complexity.67 Indeed, modelers generally begin with the simplest model they can
design before adding additional elements.68 As Soetaert and Herman say
“[t]he largest intellectual challenge of [modeling] consists in the creative
simplification of a scientific problem, in such a way that no great injustice
is done to realism.”69 Modelers stress that the most complex model is not
always the best model.70
While modeling can provide a mechanism for grappling with complexity and learning about aspects of the system, it is still modeling. At best,
modelers will recognize that modeling should generally be iterative, and
be capable of recognizing when a model needs refinement.71 Modelers
must also be explicit and transparent about their assumptions.72 Yet even
with these precautions, modelers are limited by available techniques,
heuristics, and available knowledge, as Peel describes.73 Models may allow
for prediction, explanation, and generalization, but they do not provide
certainty. Thus, in the face of complexity, some uncertainty will always
remain.
Modeling also cannot address uncertainty arising from indeterminacy,
which requires value choices. In the case of wildlife trade, core differences
64.

SOETAERT & HERMAN, supra note 8, at 1.

65.

STEVENS, supra note 8, at 3–4.

66.

Id., at 4 (describing the advantage of a road map for a traveler); SOETAERT &
HERMAN, supra note 8, at 2 (describing the benefit of a map with only the position and name
of countries, without details such as the position of houses and agricultural information).
67.

STEVENS, supra note 8, at 4; SOETART & HERMAN, supra note 8, at 1.

68.
See SOETAERT & HERMAN, supra note 8, at 15–16 (“[A] model should be as simple
as possible, but not simpler.”). See also STEVENS, supra note 8, at 4 (using this approach in his
teaching methodology).
69.

SOETAERT & HERMAN, supra note 8, at 15.

70.

Id. at 16.

71.

Id. at 7, 11.

72.

Id. at 6–7.

73.
Elements of all three of Peel’s uncertainties are implicated here, epistemological
uncertainty, methodological uncertainty, and sociological uncertainty. See PEEL, supra note
7, at 43-47.
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arise between groups opposed to captive breeding of wild animals or any
killing of wild animals, and groups focused on the maintenance of a market in wild animal products. While these disagreements can be informed
by knowledge and predictions about population dynamics, the sustainability of trade, and the likely behavior of markets, that knowledge
cannot resolve core decisions. For example, in the question of whether to
legalize a market in rhino horn, there is a possibility that such a market
could result in the extinction of current semi-wild populations of rhinoceros and the species surviving only in ranched environments. It is a
value decision whether this is a risk the parties to CITES are willing to
bear, even if all parties wish to maintain populations of rhinoceros.
II. MANAGING UNCERTAINTY: PRECAUTION
ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT

AND

A. The Precautionary Principle and Precautionary Approach
In international law, policy makers adopted the precautionary principle or precautionary approach as a tool to allow regulatory action in the
face of uncertainty. Although the principle takes different forms in different contexts, its most generalized form is embodied by Principle 15 of the
1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which provides
that “[w]here there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of
full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing costeffective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”74
This generalized form of precaution from Principle 15 demonstrates
several important aspects of the precautionary principle. First, Principle 15
limits the application of the principle to situations of “serious or irreversible damage,” implicitly creating a threshold of the type of harm implicated
before it will be triggered. This is a common approach when the precautionary principle is applied.75 Second, the principle seems to assume that
policy makers can isolate a single identifiable threat and that regulatory
action will be beneficial in stemming that threat, without concern for other
consequences of regulatory action. Third, the principle calls for “cost-effective measures” for prevention of “environmental degradation,” making
environmental protection an explicit goal to be achieved within certain
parameters, although it does not define “environmental.”76 Fourth, the
74.
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro,
Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. 1), Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
75.
See, e.g., MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. U.K.), Case No. 10, Order of Dec. 3, 2001,
available at http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_10/Order.03.12.01.
E.pdf; Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (N.Z. v. Japan; Austl. v. Japan), Cases Nos. 3, 4, Order of
Aug. 27, 1999, available at, http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_3_4/
Order.27.08.99.E.pdf; PEEL, supra note 7, at 65 (discussing the problem of reliance on a
threshold before precaution is triggered); Jacqueline Peel, Precaution – A Matter of Principle,
Approach, or Process?, 5 MELB. J. INT’L L. 483 (2004) [hereinafter Peel, Precaution].
76.
Rio Declaration, supra note 74, at 877–79.
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principle could be read as reversing the burden of proof traditionally required for action, requiring proof of safety rather than proof of harm.77
All of these aspects of the Rio Principle are the subject of extensive
debate and different definitions of the principle have been adopted in different fora over the years.78 Many commentators have sought to highlight
that the principle is highly context-dependent. This flexible context-dependent application has, in turn, consequences for where the burden of proof
will fall, what the threshold will be before application of precaution, and
what the response should be to this threshold risk. The precautionary principle has therefore been described as having strong and weak versions and
a range in between. Increasingly, commentators and decision makers are
endorsing a ‘precautionary approach’ rather than a ‘precautionary principle,’ arguing that an approach allows more flexibility than a principle.79 In
weaker versions, the principle can play a role only as a ‘preventative’ principle, justifying action that will prevent harm, but not adding any additional layer of precaution to address uncertainty.80
Even with this context-dependent application, and perhaps in part because of it, commentators have argued that the principle or approach is
too vague to be useful for decision makers. Precaution stands in the uneasy position of being accepted as a foundational part of international environmental law, while having an unfixed and unclear meaning. Perhaps
because of this status, it has been viewed as incapable of being applied in
any principled manner to environmental decision-making, making it seem
anti-scientific, indeterminate, and paralyzing, irrational, or all of the
above.81
One particular criticism is that the principle seems applicable only to a
scenario where new technologies have the potential for more harm than
good and can be banned. As many commentators have pointed out, this
does not fit most regulatory decisions, where risks must be balanced and
where potentially harmful technologies may also offset other harms and
bring significant benefits, for example with genetically modified organisms. Sunstein argues, for example, that a strong precautionary principle
applied to risks is indeterminate and potentially paralyzing because it is
77.

See id.

78.
See generally ARIE TROUWBORST, EVOLUTION AND STATUS OF THE PRECAUTIONPRINCIPLE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2002) (discussing the precautionary principle in
international law); THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CHALLENGE OF IMPLEMENTATION (David Freestone and Ellen Hey eds., 1995) (discussing the precautionary principle in international law).
ARY

79.

See, e.g., Peel, Precaution, supra note 75.

80.
See Arie Trouwborst, Prevention, Precaution, Logic, and Law, 2 ERASMUS L. REV.
105, 118 (2009).
81.

See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRIN(2005) (describing the weak version of the principle as commonsense and the strong
version of the principle as “paralyzing”) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR]; Cass R.
Sunstein, The Paralyzing Principle, 25 REG. 32 (2002).
CIPLE
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not clear that regulatory action will always result in a better outcome than
waiting.82
Some commentators apply this criticism with particular force to the
context of conservation and wildlife trade.83 In the context of wildlife
trade, a presumption behind banning trade assumes that trade is inherently harmful to a species’ survival. Therefore, if a species is threatened,
there should be less trade. A strict precautionary approach would suggest
that even if there is uncertainty, states should not wait to ban trade, but
should ban it even without full information. However, some commentators
argue that some trade can actually save a species on the brink of extinction. If this is true, banning trade before there is full information could be
more harmful than not banning trade. If decision makers recognize that
both action and inaction could cause harm, they may not know what to do
and they risk being paralyzed.84
The effect of this indeterminacy is, some argue, to leave decision makers with no guidance for what precaution actually requires them to do.
That in turn leaves the door open for value-based decision making that
may be unconnected from scientific considerations. It appears to some
that precaution could be used to override prevailing scientific consensus,
with a perception of risk triggering action even if that perception of risk is
based on value preferences and heuristic biases not based on scientific
analysis.85
For some, the response is to ignore any need for precaution and rely
solely on the available scientific evidence. This is evident in some parties’
approaches to listing decisions in CITES, as we shall see. Yet many commentators and states recognize some forms of uncertainty. The question
becomes how to navigate this uncertainty without appearing to undermine
scientific processes and conclusions.
One apparent way to do this that is increasingly taking hold is to acknowledge a role for a precautionary approach but to cabin it within decision-making processes that are perceived as more objective or more tied
to scientific methodology. In short, the move is toward a proceduralization
of the precautionary approach. This takes several forms.

82.
See SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 81, at 26–33.
83.
See BIODIVERSITY AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: RISK, UNCERTAINTY
AND PRACTICE IN CONSERVATION AND SUSTAINABLE USE (Rosie Cooney & Barney Dickson
eds., 2005) [hereinafter BIODIVERSITY AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE].
84.
See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 81. Cf. Robert V. Percival, Who’s
Afraid of the Precautionary Principle?, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 21 (2006) (defending a role
for the precautionary principle and arguing that critics of the precautionary principle are
attacking a straw man).
85.
See SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 81, at 35–49 (describing the heuristics
necessary for the precautionary principle to be operational).
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B. Precaution as Procedure: Risk Assessment, Cost-Benefit Analysis,
and Environmental Impact Assessment
One approach that spans the range of environmental problems is to
limit precaution to a procedural requirement, rather than allowing it a substantive role to play. This means that standard decision-making processes
must acknowledge uncertainty and account for it. They can do this, for
example, by accompanying conclusions with an assessment of confidence
in their accuracy. This approach does not, however, require policy decision
makers to apply precaution to their final substantive decisions.
For example, precaution can be viewed as part of risk assessment and
risk management or as part of cost-benefit analysis.86 McAllister, discussing a series of decisions in Brazil on genetically modified organisms, argues the precautionary principle should be understood as a procedural
requirement, a mechanism to allow decision makers to “identify and consider risks with caution when faced with scientific uncertainty about potentially serious environmental harms.”87 On this interpretation, the
precautionary principle is not a substitute for risk assessment or cost-benefit analysis, but an inherent part of them.88 As McAllister notes, one Protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)—the Biosafety
Protocol—“relies extensively on the precautionary principle but also specifies the use of risk assessment techniques”89 and the Rio Declaration’s
original statement of the precautionary principle “explicitly refers to the
use of cost-benefit analysis when it speaks of “cost-effective” measures.”90
Sunstein, in his rejection of the precautionary principle as a useful decision-making tool, argues in favor of a modified form of cost-benefit analysis that, he believes, would be able to account for uncertainty and address
many of the concerns that inform the desire for a precautionary approach
without abandoning science.91
Similarly, precaution is increasingly seen as being most aptly operationalized through environmental impact assessment (EIA), which requires an assessment of the likely environmental impacts of certain
activities. EIA has become a prominent tool in international environmental law. Although it has not always fully addressed uncertainty, it has the
potential to incorporate risk assessment and worst-case scenario analysis
as one way to capture uncertainty.92
86.

See SUNSTEIN, LAWS

OF

FEAR, supra note 81, at 175–203.

87.
Lesley K. McAllister, Judging GMOs: Judicial Application of the Precautionary
Principle in Brazil, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 149, 155–157 (2005).
88.

See id. at 156.

89.
Id.; Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity
arts. 10(1), 15, Jan. 29, 2000, 2226 U.N.T.S. 208.
90.

McAllister, supra note 87, at 157.

91.

SUNSTEIN, LAWS

OF

FEAR, supra note 81, at 175–203.

92.
Graham Tucker & Jo Treweek, The Precautionary Principle in Impact Assessment:
An International Review, in BIODIVERSITY AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note
83, at 73.
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As complements to moves that limit precaution to a procedural role,
commentators and decision makers often treat precaution as a tool to deal
with temporary information gaps and only apply it where the science has
already demonstrated a threshold of risk.93 This makes decision makers
feel as though they can acknowledge some uncertainty without completely
overriding scientific data. Yet this approach depends on a view both that
uncertainty can be resolved in time and that the threshold analysis of risk
can be relied on.94 It is a view that treats uncertainty as arising primarily
from current data gaps and complexity that can be minimized. Gillespie
goes further to suggest that the precautionary principle involves a second
active step for anyone applying it, namely the requirement that attempts
be made to resolve the scientific uncertainty.95 Thus, he argues, “any measures adopted under the auspice of the precautionary principle are of a
transitory nature.”96
The World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Panel in the EU Biotech decision interpreted the principle within the context of the SPS Agreement’s
process for risk analysis, which contains the embedded assumption that
more scientific knowledge could ultimately make the principle unnecessary for a particular issue.97 The International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea (ITLOS) has discussed precaution as part of environmental impact
assessment, both in a decision that applied the principle, the Southern
Bluefin Tuna case, and in a decision that decided against the party that
invoked the principle, the MOX Plant case.98 Courts in Brazil have taken
a similar approach, with the lower district court holding that the precautionary principle required an Environmental Impact Assessment,99 while
the appellate court held that other environmental risk assessment techniques could also satisfy the principle.100 Despite differences in outcome,
both Brazilian courts relied on procedure to determine whether the
agency concerned had complied with the principle.101 Similarly, within the
European Union, where the precautionary principle has been endorsed
93.
See PEEL, supra note 7 (extensively documenting the way in which judges rely on a
threshold before being willing to allow the precautionary principle or precautionary approach to be invoked).
94.
See ALEXANDER GILLESPIE, CONSERVATION, BIODIVERSITY, AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 466 (2011). See also PEEL, supra note 7, at 63–64.
95.

GILLESPIE, supra note 94 at 466.

96.

Id.

97.
See Report of the Panel, European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, at 241, 336, U.N. Doc. WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/
R, WT/DS293/R, (Sept. 29, 2006).
98.

Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, supra note 75; MOX Plant Case, supra note 75.

99.
McAllister, supra note 87, at 165 (discussing the district court’s holding that preparation of an EIA represented compliance with the principle).
100.
Id. at 168 (discussing the appellate court’s conclusion that not only an EIA, but
also other environmental risk techniques could satisfy the precautionary principle).
101.
Id. at 165–68 (discussing the two decisions); Cf. id. at 171 (describing the district
court as having substituted its judgment for that of the political decision maker with regard to
whether the Brazilian government should have banned GMO soybeans, a suggestion that the
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and developed, it has become an important component of risk assessment
and environmental impact assessment.
C. Precaution within Adaptive Management
Within conservation circles, a role has been urged for application of
precaution that is distinct from cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment
techniques. Increasingly, in conservation circles, precaution is seen as having its most important role to play within the practices of adaptive management. As discussed in Part III of the Article, this is the approach the
parties to CITES appear to have taken in dealing with the uncertainties
surrounding wildlife trade.
Adaptive management is a conservation approach adopted in response to ecologists’ recognition of complexity and uncertainty discussed
above. In response to the lessons of ecology, some commentators began to
argue in the 1970s that policymakers should develop management responses that would allow for adaptive management, moving away from
one-time decision making. Protection and management should provide for
monitoring, evaluation of results against operational goals or benchmarks,
and reevaluation of both benchmarks and approaches to achieving those
benchmarks.102 Policymakers should also build in some ability to cope
with surprise.103
In order to learn, some commentators discuss the need for experimentation, though commentators differ on how active that experimentation
should be.104 Even without resolving this debate, it is clear that monitoring of whatever experimentation or management is put in place is key. In
addition, learning from that monitoring is key. Management cannot be
adaptive if no one is paying attention to what is happening on the ground.
As Doremus argues, “[a]daptive management is, in important ways, an
information problem.”105
Incorporating precaution within adaptive management brings together
adaptive management’s focus on monitoring and science-based decision
making with the recognition of complexity and uncertainty. Precaution can
provide a means of ensuring that scientists are questioning their work and
that decision makers do not assume that science can provide every answer.
district court made its decision on the basis of substantive concerns rather than procedural
concerns, a point I’ll return to later).
102.
See Wiersema, Train Without Tracks, supra note 10, at 1252, fig. 1.
103.
Id. For further discussion of efforts to introduce adaptive management into U.S.
environmental policy, see also Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative
Law for Adaptive Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2014); J.B. Ruhl & Robert L. Fischman,
Adaptive Management in the Courts, 95 MINN. L. REV. 424 (2010); J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by
Adaptive Management—Is It Possible?, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 21 (2005); Robin Kundis
Craig, “Stationary is Dead”—Long Live Transformation: Five Principles for Climate Change
Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9 (2010).
104.
Doremus, Information Problem, supra note 17 (describing the different approaches to experimentation.
105.
Id.
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When seen in this light, precaution is no longer seen as counter to science
but instead as complementary.106
The move is interesting, however, because it shifts precaution away
from playing a substantive function in decision-making and moves it into a
more process-oriented role. It allows for meta-analysis of the scientific decision-making process without actually bringing any non-scientific concerns into play.
D. Analysis and Conclusion
The move to limit precaution’s role to procedures and the move to
incorporate precaution within adaptive management are based on a
shared assumption. They have in common the view that precaution should
not function at the regulatory decision-making stage as an additional element in the decision-making process. Instead, precaution should either be
incorporated within assessment procedures, as with environmental impact
assessment and risk assessment, or be used as a means of evaluating the
quality of the scientific data informing the ultimate policy decision. Under
this approach, the decision maker is not required to apply precaution as an
additional substantive factor and the burden of proof required for activities to go ahead is not reversed. Instead, the decision maker is required to
incorporate precaution into the procedures they use to evaluate the data.
These moves are indeed critical and an important role for precaution
to play. As Peel points out, a precautionary approach is necessary for decision makers when they evaluate scientific data because of the uncertainties
inherent within scientific processes.107 Thus, Peel would go further than
many commentators in suggesting that precaution does not require a
threshold showing of harm.108 Its most significant role is in ensuring that
uncertainty is accounted for.109
It is easy to see the appeal of this approach for situations where data is
contested, uncertainty is prevalent, and conservation constituencies are informed by value concerns beyond science. Basing decision-making on apparently objective criteria, with an element of precaution added to address
acknowledged weaknesses of those criteria, appears to be a way to limit
non-conservation objectives and limit disagreement among decision-making. In the search for the right decision, it seems that science should prevail and precaution should only play a supporting role to that science,
informing the procedures for scientific work and decision makers’ evaluation of that work.
Yet even if this procedural role for precaution is necessary, the question remains whether this procedural role alone is sufficient. Can it diminish value disputes and ensure that decision makers act in the best interests
of environmental protection? Can it ensure that decision makers have
106.

Id.

107.

PEEL, supra note 7, at 54–55.
Id., at 221–222.
Id., at 222.

108.
109.
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fully accounted for all of the sources of uncertainty that are inherent in
managing conservation? Part III discusses the role of precaution and adaptive management within CITES in order to shed light on these questions.
III. MANAGING UNCERTAINTY

WITHIN

CITES

Under international law, international trade of wild fauna and flora is
regulated through the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species (CITES).110 It has significant participation by states and has been
referred to as the most important conservation treaty in force.111
The CITES text contains no explicit reference to the precautionary
principle in its treaty text, which is not surprising given that the treaty was
negotiated before the principle became prominent in international environmental law. Precaution is explicitly mentioned in the listing criteria developed through subsequent resolutions at Conferences of the Parties.112
Parties occasionally refer to precaution in listing proposals, and experts
working on CITES have also invoked precaution. However, evidence of
strong reliance on precaution in CITES decision-making is hard to find.
On the other hand, over the years, the parties to CITES have emphasized
the need for science-based decision-making and have developed new
mechanisms for monitoring and information gathering to strengthen this
science-based foundation.
This Section discusses the role of both precaution and monitoring in
key aspects of CITES decision making in order to shed light on the way in
which the parties view uncertainty. This Section focuses on the CITES listing criteria and on non-detriment findings, as well as discussing several
particular species that the parties to CITES have addressed in recent years
and will likely be addressing again at CoP 17 in 2016.
A. Structure of CITES
By its terms, CITES applies only to species threatened by international trade.113 Its treaty text establishes a structure based on three appen110.
CITES, supra note 5.
111.
See Michael Bowman, A Tale of Two CITES: Divergent Perspectives upon the Effectiveness of the Wildlife Trade Convention, 22 REV. EUR. COMP. & INT’L ENVTL. L. 228, 228
(2013).
112.
CITES, 25th Meeting of the Animal Comm., Geneva, Switz., July 18-22, 2011, Criteria for Inclusion of Species of Appendices I and II, AC25 Doc. 10 [hereinafter Criteria for
Inclusion]. For discussion of the role of CoP resolutions in the evolution of the treaty, see
Annecoos Wiersema, The New International Law-Makers? Conferences of the Parties to Multilateral Environmental Agreements, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 231, 241–245 (2009) (discussing the
significance of examples of CITES CoP activity). See generally id. (discussing the legal status
of CoP activity and its relation to the state parties’ underlying treaty obligations).
113.
See CITES, supra note 5, at preamble (recognizing both “that peoples and States
are and should be the best protectors of their own wild fauna and flora,” and that international cooperation is required for protection of certain species “against over-exploitation
through international trade”); id., art. 2 (limiting the scope of the treaty to species “which are
or may be affected by trade” and species that may become threatened with extinction “unless
trade in specimens of such species is subject to strict regulation”).
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dices. Species are to be listed, through votes of the parties, based on their
current level of threat if international trade would contribute to further
threat to their survival. Once species are listed on any of the Appendices,
international trade must only be in accordance with the treaty’s provisions.114 For a species to be listed on either Appendix, the parties must
agree to that listing by a two-thirds majority of the parties present and
voting.115
Appendix I is reserved for “all species threatened with extinction
which are or may be affected by trade.”116 For these species, both export
and import permits are required.117 For the export permit, the Scientific
Authority in the exporting state must advise that the trade “will not be
detrimental to the survival of that species.”118 The importing state’s Scientific Authority must advise that the import “will be for purposes which are
not detrimental to the survival of the species involved.”119 These are nondetriment findings, common to both Appendices I and II and discussed
further below.
In addition to requiring that any trade not be detrimental to the survival of the species, the Management Authority of the importing state
must be satisfied that the Appendix I-listed specimen “is not to be used for
primarily commercial purposes.”120 Trade for “primarily commercial purposes” is thereby prohibited for Appendix I species and listing a species
on Appendix I results in what amounts to a ban on virtually all international trade in that species and its parts, although the word ‘ban’ is not
used in the Convention.121
Appendix II listing is for “all species which although not necessarily
now threatened with extinction may become so unless trade in specimens
of such species is subject to strict regulation in order to avoid utilization
114.

Id. art. 2(4).

115.

Id. art. 15(1).

116.

Id. art. 2(1).

117.

Id. arts. 3(2) & (3).

118.

Id. art. 3(2)(a).

119.

Id.

120.
See id. arts 3(2)(d) &3(3)(c); see also WILLEM WIJNSTEKERS, THE EVOLUTION
CITES 128 (9th ed. 2011).

OF

121.
The extent to which Appendix I listing amounts to an international trade ban is
affected by how the parties interpret the treaty phrase ‘primarily commercial purposes.’ See
CITES, 5th Meeting of the Conf. of the Parties, Buenos Aires, Arg., Apr. 22–May 3, 1985,
Definition of ‘Primarily Commercial Purposes, ¶¶ 3, 4, Res. Conf. 5.10 (Rev. CoP15), available at http://www.cites.org/eng/res/05/05-10R15.php (stating that countries of import should
define the phrase as broadly as possible, and clarifying that the question of commercial purposes relates to use after import and not to the particular transaction at the time of import).
See generally WIJNSTEKERS, supra note 120, at 128–132 (discussing the CoP Resolution in
detail and outlining examples of trade that would or would not be considered to be for primarily commercial purposes). A few exceptions to the ban are permitted in the treaty.
CITES, supra note 5, art. 7. These exceptions do not affect the prohibition on commercial
trade of wild-bred species and specimens being exported from their country of origin. Id. arts.
7(3)(a) & 7(4).
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incompatible with their survival.”122 In addition, the treaty provides for
listing on Appendix II for non-threatened species whose listing is necessary to ensure that trade in specimens of threatened species listed on Appendix II “may be brought under effective control.”123 This allows,
therefore, for listing of lookalike species.
The effect of Appendix II listing is not to ban international trade, but
essentially to provide for its regulation so that the species will not reach a
point of needing to be listed on Appendix I. Import permits are not required for Appendix II species and import for “primarily commercial purposes” is not prohibited. Instead, listing on Appendix II is supposed to
ensure that a species does not become threatened with extinction in two
main ways. First, the treaty again provides that the Scientific Authority of
the exporting state must advise that export “will not be detrimental to the
survival of that species.”124 This is the same wording as that for the export
permits for Appendix I.125 Second, the treaty provides that Scientific Authorities are supposed to monitor export permits and actual exports of Appendix II species and specimens. Whenever the Authority determines that
export should be limited “in order to maintain that species throughout its
range at a level consistent with its role in the ecosystems in which it occurs
and well above the level at which that species might become eligible for
inclusion in Appendix I,” the Authority shall advise the Management Authority “of suitable measures to be taken to limit the grant of export permits.”126 Thus, under this provision, both monitoring of trade in Appendix
II species and response to that monitoring is required. These rules are discussed further in Section C below.
The treaty also provides for a third appendix for species that a party is
regulating within its own jurisdiction “for the purpose of preventing or
restricting exploitation” and for which it needs “the co-operation of other
Parties in the control of trade.”127 Export of Appendix III species whose
origin is the state that has listed the species requires an export permit from
that state that is based on compliance with the domestic laws of that
state.128 The treaty adds that shipment must minimize “risk of injury, damage to health or cruel treatment,” as it does for trade in species listed on
any of the three appendices, but the treaty does not add any additional
conservation requirements to export of Appendix III species.129 Thus, Appendix III essentially allows states to impose their own requirements on
international trade if they deem it necessary for a particular species, even
if the species concerned does not meet the criteria of Appendix I or II.
122.

CITES, supra note 5, art. 2(2)(a).

123.

Id., art. 2(2)(b).

124.

Id. art. 4(2)(a).

125.

See id. art. 3(2)(a).

126.

Id. art. 4(3).

127.

Id. art. 2(3).

128.

Id. art. 5(2)(a).

129.

See id. arts. 3(2)(c), 3(4)(b), & 5(2)(b).
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These requirements need not mirror the treaty’s requirements for Appendix I or Appendix II species, meaning that the treaty does not require any
kind of non-detriment finding or limit on trade for primarily commercial
purposes. Under this provision, individual state parties can take a precautionary or preventative approach to trade in their own species if they so
wish.
The listing that lies at the heart of CITES has a precautionary aspect
to it, seeking to ensure that international trade does not result in the irreversible harm of extinction of a species. In addition, listing on Appendix II
can result in regulation and monitoring of trade that could in turn generate
information that can help that species. In this sense, Appendix II embodies a notion of precaution facilitated by monitoring and the potential for
adaptive responses.
The capacity of Appendix II listing to provide this kind of information
depends on a number of actions made possible by Appendix II listing,
although far from guaranteed because of different technical capacity
among member states. First, the requirement of an export permit for an
Appendix II species to be exported allows for the tracking of movement of
that species across borders.130 Second, listing should ensure that trade is
not harmful to survival of the species due to the requirement of a nondetriment finding for the issuance of an export permit.131 Third, Appendix
II-listed species are subject to a provision in the treaty that is not applied
to Appendix I species for whom commercial trade is prohibited completely. As mentioned above, Article 4(3) of the treaty states that:
A Scientific Authority in each Party shall monitor both the export
permits granted by that State for specimens of species included in
Appendix II and the actual exports of such specimens. Whenever
a Scientific Authority determines that the export of specimens of
any such species should be limited in order to maintain that species throughout its range at a level consistent with its role in the
ecosystems in which it occurs and well above the level at which
that species might become eligible for inclusion in Appendix I, the
Scientific Authority shall advise the appropriate Management Authority of suitable measures to be taken to limit the grant of export permits for specimens of that species.132
Article 4(3) therefore provides a mechanism for preventing further
decline of a species because it requires action to avoid the species being
eligible for listing on Appendix I. This is significant because it indicates
that avoidance of listing on Appendix I is intended, under the original
treaty terms, to be part of the management plan for Appendix II species.

130.

See CITES Trade, supra note 1.

131.

CITES, supra note 5, art. 4(2)(a).

132.

Id. art. 4(3).
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B. Precaution and Monitoring in the Listing Criteria
The parties have included the precautionary approach within their listing criteria, although they rarely invoke it to support listing. As we shall
see, the approach to precaution in the listing criteria is one that equates
precaution with monitoring and adaptive responses to monitoring.
Listing decisions lie at the heart of CITES. It is through listing on
either Appendix I or II that CITES operates, regulating international
trade in those listed species. Yet listing decisions are complicated by fundamental disagreements about the role of utilization and trade in species
conservation. This translates into two main debates. First, the idea that
banning commercial trade in a species will always help ensure that species’
survival is itself contested. Some commentators and countries suggest that,
because trade can be beneficial for the survival of some species, listing
itself should be a last resort. In addition, commentators note that banning
commercial trade can have a detrimental effect on livelihoods and that
sound conservation can accommodate sustainable utilization.133 Second,
certain species trigger another set of concerns, namely the appropriateness
of killing or domestication of some or all animals. These debates often
merge but reflect distinct concerns. The first concern involves predictions
and information about the viability of sustainable utilization for population viability of particular species.134 The second concern invokes values
that go beyond what the data might tell decision makers.
The effect of these debates has been to create a fracture among
CITES decision makers about whether parties should favor listing or disfavor listing. Contentious debates have arisen with regard to Appendix I
listing for proposals to down-list a species from Appendix I to Appendix II
or to up-list a species from Appendix II to Appendix I. Disputes are not
limited to the context of Appendix I listing. Parties have also disagreed
about whether to list a species on Appendix II, with some parties seeking
lesser regulation even than Appendix II offers. This was particularly evident over the course of multiple CoPs for certain species traditionally
traded at large commercial volume, such as timber and fish species.135
The parties have sought to avoid these debates in specific listing decisions by seeking to ground listing decisions in science. The current listing
criteria provide a set of biological and trade criteria tied to science and to
133.
See Rosie Cooney and Max Abensperg-Traun, Raising Local Community Voices:
CITES, Livelihoods, and Sustainable Use, 22 REV. OF EUR. COMP. & INT’L ENVTL. L. 301,
303 (2013). This discussion relates primarily to species listed on Appendix I, because commercial trade in species listed on Appendix II is rarely limited.
134.
See generally Wiersema, Uncertainty and Markets, supra note 57 (discussing uncertainty in debates about sustainable utilization).
135.
Soledad Aguilar, Regulatory Tools for the Management of Fish and Timber Species
Through CITES, 22 REV. OF EUR., COMP. & INT’L. ENVTL L. 281, 281 (2013); Sara F.
Oldfield, The Evolving Role of CITES in Regulating the International Timber Trade, 22 REV.
OF EUR. COMP. & INT’L ENVTL. L. 291, 293 (2013).
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the legal requirements of the treaty that, in theory at least, require the
parties to make decisions without resort to non-scientific principles.136
In 1994, the precautionary principle was included in the first set of
detailed listing criteria, known as the Fort Lauderdale criteria (now superseded).137 The parties resolved that “when considering any proposal to
amend Appendix I or II the Parties shall apply the precautionary principle
so that scientific uncertainty should not be used as a reason for failing to
act in the best interest of the conservation of the species.”138 Similarly,
Annex 4 of the Fort Lauderdale criteria referred to the parties acting in
the best interest of the conservation of the species when considering proposals to amend the Appendices “in the case of uncertainty, either as regards the status of a species or as regards the impact of trade on the
conservation of a species.”139 While this version of the precautionary principle does not explicitly demand listing in the face of uncertainty, it also
does nothing to turn the presumption away from listing.
A few years later, a multi-year process began to amend these criteria
in response to concerns about whether they were sufficiently based in science. The initial proposals for revision presented to the parties at CoP12
deleted the references to the precautionary principle and the reference to
uncertainty, replacing them with a reference to the parties adopting measures “proportionate to the anticipated risks to the species.”140 This is a
telling proposal. Shifting the discussion to being one about risk assessment
and proportionate response suggests a belief that the scientific evidence
could be weighed, with risk assessed, closer to the procedural approaches
to precaution described above.
In addition to deleting references to the precautionary principle, the
proposed new listing criteria would have changed the trade criteria a proposing party would need to satisfy. The Fort Lauderdale criteria had called
for listing if a species is “known to be in trade, probably in trade, but
conclusive evidence is lacking, or there is potential international demand,
or it would probably enter trade were it not subject to [A]ppendix 1 controls.”141 The new proposal would have listing only occur “[i]f [the species]
was known to be in trade, and that trade has a detrimental impact on the
status of the species, or it is suspected to be in trade, or there is potential
136.

See Criteria for Inclusion, supra note 112, at 13.

137.
See CITES, Resolutions of the Conference of the Parties, 9th Meeting of the Conf.
of the Parties, Conf. 9.24 (Rev. CoP15) at 87 (Nov. 7–18, 1994), available at http://
www.cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/cop/09/E9-Res.pdf. This resolution has now been
amended. A very basic set of criteria had been in operation before 1994, the Berne Criteria,
but they did little to elaborate.
138.

Id.

139.

Id., annex 4, at 89.

140.
CITES, 12th Meeting of the Conf. of the Parties, Santiago, Chile, Nov. 3-15, 2002,
Revision of Resolution Conf. 9.24, at 14, CoP12 Doc. 58, Annex 5a [hereinafter Revision of
Resolution Conf. 9.24 Annex 5a]., available at http://www.cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/cop/
12/doc/E12-58-A5a.pdf
141.

Id., at 63.

Spring 2015]

Wildlife Trade

401

international demand for the species that may be detrimental to its survival in the wild.”142 The possibility of listing on the basis of probability
without conclusive evidence would be removed. This does not reflect even
a weak version of the precautionary principle.
Several countries objected to these proposals, observing that sometimes information would be lacking and noting that the new criteria might
limit listing under those circumstances.143 Others supported the changes,
expressly referring to the need for “sound science” as the basis for both
the biological criteria and the trade criteria.144
In the end, a form of precaution was brought back into the criteria
before they were adopted in their current form.145 In the operative part of
the criteria, the parties resolved that:
when considering proposals to amend Appendix I and II, the parties shall, by virtue of the precautionary approach and in case of
uncertainty either as regards the status of a species or the impact
of trade on the conservation of a species, act in the best interest of
the conservation of the species concerned and adopt measures
that are proportionate to the anticipated risks to the species.146
The parties also resolved that proposals to amend Appendices I and II
“should be based on the best information available.”147
The precautionary approach is not explicitly referred to in the detailed
biological or trade criteria. Specific precautionary measures are instead,
elaborated in a separate section of the current criteria, Annex 4.148 In addition, where sufficient data are available to indicate that a species warrants delisting, either from Appendix I or Appendix II, the criteria state
that delisting should only occur “in accordance with the relevant precautionary measures listed in Annex 4 [setting out precautionary
measures].”149
Yet Annex 4’s precautionary measures are strikingly limited. Beyond
repetition of the overall exhortation to apply the precautionary approach
in its opening chapeau, Annex 4’s specific precautionary measures do not
142.

Id. at 63, 68.

143.
See, e.g., id. at 1 (comments by Australia), 3 (comments by Denmark), 4 (comments by Spain and Great Britain), 5 (comments by New Zealand), 5-6 (comments by United
States). See also id. at 12–13, 14–15 (comments by various countries on the specific amendments proposed).
144.
Id. at 5 (comments from Norway). See also id. at 15 (comments from Japan). For
more discussion of the debates surrounding the revision of the listing criteria and inclusion of
the precautionary approach in the criteria, see Annecoos Wiersema, Adversaries or Partners?
Science and the Precautionary Principle in International Wildlife Treaty Regimes, 11 J. INT’L
WILDLIFE L. & POL’Y 211, 223-28 (2009) [hereinafter Wiersema, Adversaries or Partners?].
145.

Criteria for Inclusion, supra note 112, at 4.

146.

Id. at 2.

147.

Id.

148.

See id. at 17.

149.

Id. at 2.
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refer to uncertainty or even an absence of data.150 They focus on provisions to limit when species may be down-listed and de-listed, explicitly
addressing the possibility that down-listing could trigger increased impact
on a species from inadequately controlled or increased trade.151 Tellingly,
these precautionary measures allow down-listing from Appendix I to Appendix II even if the de-listed species is likely to be in demand for trade,
provided the parties are compliant with the treaty’s provisions for Appendix II species and have put in place measures for enforcement controls and
compliance, or have specified an export quota or other special management measure.152 If quotas are relied on, Annex 4 provides for review
procedures.153
The biological and trade criteria themselves contain only limited and
mostly indirect acknowledgements of uncertainty and lack of information.
The criteria allow action on the basis of what is “known, or can be inferred
or projected,” defined in Annex 5’s “Definitions, Explanation and Guidelines.”154 Annex 5 refers to some choice of methodological approach and
refers to “stochastic events” in the list of extrinsic factors that can affect
extinction risk.155 Further, Annex 6, setting out the format for proposals
to amend the appendices acknowledges that “for some species the amount
of scientific information will be limited,” meaning that proposals may not
always have all the information requested for the proposal.156
Yet these limited acknowledgements of the need for inferences or projections and the possibility of missing information do not address how the
parties should deal with these uncertainties. The criteria also do not address how the parties should evaluate data and the possibility of differing
information or multiple methodologies producing different results. The
criteria contain no explicit reference to “uncertainty” and there is no provision for a preventative or precautionary cushion to ensure survival of the
species.
Thus, despite the fact that the criteria explicitly refer to the precautionary approach, they do little to grapple with uncertainty and the complexities of applying the principle. When the criteria specify particular
measures for the application of the precautionary approach, they place
heavy reliance on management mechanisms and monitoring.
The context of amendment of the criteria is important to illuminate
why this might be. As we have seen, early proposals had removed the
precautionary principle or approach from the criteria completely, endorsed by the Secretariat. This was seen by some states as an attempt to
limit the use of listing and to promote sustainable utilization. States explic150.

Criteria for Inclusion, supra note 112, at 5–6.

151.

Id.

152.

Id. at 5–6.

153.

Id. at 6.

154.

Id. at 4.

155.

Id. at 7 & 10.

156.

Id. at 11.
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itly in favor of this change were among those known to favor more sustainable utilization of certain species, namely Norway and Japan. Parties
favoring deletion of precaution highlighted the need to base decisions on
science. Parties favoring reference to precaution highlighted the same
thing, but added reference to uncertainty. One can infer that the compromise reached was a way to maintain a sense among the parties that scientific decision-making would prevail. Precaution is then seen as leaving too
much room for what are perceived to be value judgments to inform listing
decisions.
Thus, while a reference to precaution was maintained in the listing
criteria, its particular role has been limited to one ensuring monitoring and
adaptive responses. The potential for a more expansive application of precaution has not been pursued, as is evident from listing decisions for specific species discussed further below.
C.

Adaptive Management for Non-Detriment Findings

This preference for adaptive management and monitoring over explicit endorsement of precaution is also evident in another key aspect of
CITES operations: non-detriment findings.
Under the terms of the treaty, the export of Appendix I- and II-listed
species must not be detrimental to the survival of the species.157 In order
to ensure this, the parties’ Scientific Authorities must make non-detriment
findings when they grant export permits.158 Non-detriment findings can
serve as both a trigger for countries to gather information and monitor
trade, and a trigger for them to respond to new information. Beyond the
requirement of non-detriment findings for export permits, monitoring of
exports is also critical for parties to comply with their obligations regarding Appendix II-listed species to limit trade if necessary “in order to maintain [a] species throughout its range at a level consistent with its role in the
ecosystems in which it occurs and well above the level at which that species might become eligible for inclusion in Appendix I.”159 These nondetriment findings are, therefore, an important component of the effective
operation of the treaty’s terms and, since commercial trade is not permitted in any case for Appendix I-listed species, these findings are particularly important for trade in Appendix II-listed species to ensure that
commercial trade in those species is sustainable.160
157.
CITES, supra note 5, arts. 3(3)(a) & 4(2)(a). This is also required for import permits for Appendix I-listed species. Id. art. 3(2)(a). Since commercial trade is not permitted
for Appendix I-listed species, this discussion focuses on non-detriment findings for export
permits for Appendix II-listed species. Non-detriment findings are also required for introduction from the sea of Appendix I- and Appendix II-listed species. Id. arts. 3(5)(a) & 4(6)(a).
158.
CITES, Designation and Role of the Scientific Authorities, 10th Meeting of the
Conf. of Parties, Conf. 10.3 (Jun. 9–20, 1997), available at http://www.cites.org/eng/res/10/1003C15.php.
159.
CITES, supra note 5, at art. 4(3).
160.
See Aguilar, supra note 135, at 283 (describing robust non-detriment findings as
providing “the foundation for the effectiveness of CITES in regulating and managing trade in
Appendix II species”).
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However, compliance with these non-detriment finding requirements
has been far from complete, largely due to capacity and information
problems.161 Non-detriment findings will often require significant resources and information.162 Information about non-detriment findings has
been limited through the course of CITES lifespan and no formal publication of these findings has been required.163 As a result, Scientific Authorities have not been able to benefit from other Scientific Authorities’
work.164 On the basis of her interviews, Aguilar finds that in practice Scientific Authorities “often make decisions on an intuitive basis, based on
their own knowledge and the advice of researchers and experts in the
field.”165 Indeed, even compliance with the requirement that a state party
designate a Scientific Authority, a pre-requisite to compliance with the
specific terms of the treaty regarding non-detriment findings, has been
incomplete.166
The obligations related to non-detriment findings have remained in
the hands of the state parties, rather than defined in detail by the Conferences of the Parties, with even guidance being somewhat limited until relatively recently. Parties have expressed wariness of any binding effect of
decisions on non-detriment findings.167
An earlier CoP Resolution 10.3, replacing an earlier Resolution, states
that the non-detriment finding should be based on “scientific review of
available information on the population status, distribution, population
trend, harvest and other biological and ecological factors, as appropriate,
and trade information relating to the species concerned.”168 Beyond this,
until recently, CoP Resolutions have largely resulted in the Secretariat coordinating the development of guidelines and workshops for training for
161.
See id.; ROSALIND REEVE, POLICING INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED
SPECIES: THE CITES TREATY AND COMPLIANCE, 152–154 (2002); James Murphy, Alternative
Approaches to the CITES “Non-Detriment” Finding for Appendix II Species, 36 ENVTL. L.
531, 538 (2006). See also Smith et al., supra note 6 (discussing challenges for making nondetriment findings and ways to improve those findings).
162.
Aguilar, supra note 135, at 283; Smith et al., supra note 6, at 84 (observing that for
many CITES-listed species, decisions on non-detriment findings will not be straightforward).
163.
Smith et al., supra note 6, at 88.
164.
Id.
165.
Aguilar, supra note 135, at 283.
166.
Designation and Role of the Scientific Authorities, supra note 156, at 1 (noting that
the Secretariat’s reports have identified “several Parties that have not designated Scientific
Authorities”).
167.
CITES, 15th Meeting of the Conf. of the Parties, Doha, Qatar, Mar. 13–25, 2010,
Report of the Animals and Plants Committees, CoP15 Doc. 16.2.2 [hereinafter Report of the
Animals and Plants Committees] (Mexico expressing concern about whether any future draft
resolution would be binding and urging flexibility); id. at 4-5 (Animals Committee recognizing concern of Parties regarding any binding effect); id. at 3 (Zambia requesting respect for
the need for sustainable use of natural resources in Zambia). See also CITES, 15th Meeting
of the Conf. of the Parties, Doha, Qatar, Summary Record of the Second Session of Committee 1, CoP Com.I Rec.2 (Rev. 1) 16.2.2 (Mar. 15, 2010) (inserting non legally binding before
“guidelines” in the draft decisions and ensuring that it says it will be a tool).
168.
Designation and Role of the Scientific Authorities, supra note 158, ¶ h.
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Scientific Authorities.169 In some instances, the CoP itself has set export
quotas, which then superseded the requirement for a state party’s Scientific Authority to make a non-detriment finding.170
In recent years, the parties have done more to advance the capacity of
state parties to comply with the treaty provisions on non-detriment findings.171 In response to a proposal presented to the parties at CoP14 in
2007, an international expert workshop was held in Cancun in 2008, “attended by 103 participants from thirty-three countries of the six CITES
regions.” This, coupled with work from the Animals and Plants Committee, resulted in a decision at the most recent CoP in 2013. It was the first to
address non-detriment findings specifically and to provide guiding principles for Scientific Authorities to take into account. While these guiding
principles are explicitly non-binding,172 the fact that they are contained in
a CoP Resolution gives them some legitimacy, having been adopted by the
parties.173
The final resolution agreed to at CoP16, Resolution Conf. 16.7 on
Non-Detriment Findings, drew on the work of the expert workshop.174
The Resolution contains more than the checklist of scientific concerns that
was contained in the earlier Resolution 10.3. It adds recommendations, in
the form of non-binding guiding principles, for what Scientific Authorities
should take into account in considering whether trade would be detrimental to the survival of a species. As well as reiterating the standard set out in
Article 4(3)175 and reiterating that non-detriment findings should be “the
result of a science-based assessment,”176 the Resolution recommends that
parties take into account the volume of both legal and illegal trade, including what is “known, inferred, projected, [and] estimated” relative to the
vulnerability of the species based on both intrinsic and extrinsic factors.177
In this way, the guidance builds in a recommendation that parties account
for what is still unknown, but can be inferred, projected, or estimated. In
169.
See, e.g., CITES, Guidance for CITES Scientific Authorities: Checklist to Assist in
Making Non-Detriment Findings for Appendix II Exports (A. Rosser and M. Haywood eds.
2002), Inf. 11.3 (2000), available at http://www.cites.org/eng/cop/11/info/03.pdf.
170.
Aguilar, supra note 135; Non-Detriment Findings, CITES, http://www.cites.org/
eng/prog/ndf/index.php (last visited Feb. 20, 2015). Some of these allow for amendment in
response to new information. See generally Aguilar, supra note 135, and Murphy, supra note
161, on the relationship of NDFs to nationally established quotas.
171.
This includes several CITES decisions containing guidance on particular taxonomic groups.
172.
CITES, 16th Meeting of the Conf. of the Parties, Bangkok, Thai., Mar. 3–14, 2013,
Non-Detriment Findings, ¶ a, Res. Conf. 16.7, [hereinafter Resolution Conf. 16.7].
173.
Aguilar, supra note 135.
174.
See Resolution Conf. 16.7, supra note 172.
175.
Article 4(3) requires that Scientific Authorities act to limit export “in order to
maintain that species throughout its range at a level consistent with its role in the ecosystems
in which it occurs.” CITES, supra note 5, at art. 4(3); see also Resolution Conf. 16.7, supra
note 170, at Recommendations, ¶ a(ii).
176.
Resolution Conf. 16.7, supra note 172, at Recommendations, ¶ a(i).
177.
Id. ¶ a(iii).
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addition, the Resolution urges that an important consideration be “the implementation of adaptive management, including monitoring.”178
The Resolution recommends that the data requirements for a nondetriment finding “should be proportionate to the vulnerability of the species concerned.”179 Where a species is more vulnerable, more evidence
seems to be warranted that export will not result in detriment to the survival of the species. Although this does not per se reverse the burden of
proof so that trade is always prohibited, it does provide a highly contextualized way to address the burden of proof, consistent with what we have
seen in the precautionary principle: the greater the possibility of irreversible harm, the greater the evidence needed to allow trade. In addition, the
Resolution lists relevant sources of information, consistent with its urging
of science-based decision-making.180
Although adaptive management is explicitly endorsed in the Resolution, precaution is not mentioned. Yet documents from the International
Expert Workshop on Non-Detriment Findings—that heavily informed the
Resolution—provide an interesting contrast. During the workshop, after
some plenary sessions, the 103 attendees broke into working groups organized on taxonomic and life form lines, working with taxon-specific case
studies and developing general guidelines.181 Despite using different terminology, these working groups generally addressed precaution and the
recognition that more precaution would be appropriate where there is less
information or where the species was less resilient.182 They also referred
to the importance of monitoring and principles of adaptive
management.183
Despite these references to the precautionary approach within the
summary of the Experts Workshop, nowhere does the final CoP Resolution 16.7 with guidance on non-detriment findings refer to precaution, caution, or the precautionary approach.184 The Resolution does refer to “the
implementation of adaptive management, including monitoring,” as “an
important consideration in the making of a non-detriment finding.”185 If
adaptive management and monitoring are assumed to incorporate a pre178.

Id. ¶ a(viii).

179.

Id. ¶ a(iv).

180.

Id. ¶ a(x).

181.

Report of the Animals and Plants Committees, supra note 167, at 4, ¶ 7.

182.
Id. at 7, ¶ 10; see also id. at 17 (summary report of the Trees Working Group ), 18
(summary report of the Perennial Plants Working Group), 19 (summary report of the Succulents and Cycads Working Group), 20 (summary report of the Geophytes and Epiphytes
Working Group), 21 (summary report of the Mammals Working Group), 24 (summary report
of the Fishes Working Group).
183.
Id. at 9–10. See also id., Annex 3, specifically e.g., at 17 (summary report of the
Trees Working Group), 18 (summary report of the Perennial Plants Working Group ), 21
(summary report of the Mammals Working Group), 24 (summary report of the Fishes Working Group), 26 (summary report of the Aquatic Invertebrates Working Group).
184.

Resolution Conf. 16.7, supra note 172.

185.

Id. ¶ a(viii).
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cautionary approach, this reference should be sufficient. However, the expert workshop working groups’ reports did not subsume precaution within
monitoring and adaptive management.
The shift suggests something important about the way in which policymakers address information gaps and the way scientists do. While the scientific experts recognized the need for caution and precaution as distinct
from monitoring and adaptive management, the policy makers seemed unwilling to bring precaution to bear on decision-making that they wanted to
regard as science-based. Thus, the emphasis on science-based decisionmaking without engaging with the need for a layer of precaution within
and beyond the science makes it appear that the science will be able to
direct an answer. Caution is enveloped within adaptive management and
within the recognition of “proportionality.” In this sense, it seems to be
the task of the scientists to exercise precaution, rather than the task of the
policy decision makers.
D.

Listing and Trade Decisions

As is clear from the discussion of polar bears, sharks and ivory trade
in Part I, uncertainty pervades wildlife trade and can lead to contestation
and disagreement. This Section discusses how the parties have addressed
aspects of trade in three groups of species to shed light on how the parties
have dealt with uncertainty and contested science. The examples show that
the parties have focused on current data gaps and have addressed these by
seeking more data in the form of monitoring. Yet this monitoring cannot
resolve the other uncertainties at play: current data gaps, historical data
gaps, complexity and variables, and indeterminacy. In these debates, the
focus is primarily on monitoring and gathering information, rather than
more explicit references to adaptive management.
Although the precautionary approach is explicitly mentioned in the
CITES listing criteria, evidence from discussions about listing certain highprofile species suggests that many of the parties to CITES are unwilling to
rely heavily on precaution even where scientific information is acknowledged to be lacking. The examples discussed here reinforce the view that
the parties do not rely on precaution as heavily persuasive in debates
about whether and where to list species, even if parties are taking it into
account in their votes. The parties are, however, willing to give significant
attention to efforts to decrease uncertainty through increased monitoring,
sharing of information, and capacity building to enhance scientific knowledge. Where precaution is mentioned, it is often seen as part of those
efforts.
The examples below cover the process leading to listing of certain
shark species at CoP16 in 2013, unsuccessful proposals to list the polar
bear at CoP15 and CoP16, and the role of monitoring to address deep
conflicts about whether ivory should be legally traded. The examples do
not represent all CITES activities or stand in for all CITES species. Nor
are they all meant to be interchangeable: the species vary from each other
in many ways, including the source of their primary threat, the extent of
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what is known about them, the source of demand for their parts, and
whether their parts can be used without killing.
The examples share one thing in common that also makes them distinct from many of the species listed on CITES Appendices. These are all
high-profile fauna-charismatic megafauna that inspire passionate debate,
including debate about whether any killing or capture is appropriate and
about concern for local livelihoods from utilization of the species. Yet the
fact that these species are subject to intense debate also makes them useful
examples for a study in how the CITES parties use precaution and monitoring to navigate uncertainty and deal with deep divisions.
In addition, these examples were chosen because they involve different aspects of listing decision-making at CITES. The listings of three shark
species at CoP16 involved listing these shark species on Appendix II, having not been listed previously except by a few countries on Appendix III.
The polar bear listing proposals involved whether to up-list the polar bear
from Appendix II to Appendix I. Debates about ivory involve a species
that is split-listed, with some populations listed on Appendix I and some
on Appendix II, and with a unique regime governing sale of ivory even
from Appendix II-listed species.
1. Appendix II Listing of Shark Species
From the beginning, questions about whether to list certain shark species on CITES have been dogged by two issues, namely whether CITES is
the appropriate forum for addressing shark trade and the lack of information about biological and trade data.
On one side, several countries argued that the Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) and Regional Fisheries Management Organizations
(RFMOs) were the bodies responsible for managing fish stocks, including
shark stocks. These countries seem particularly concerned that involving
CITES in the management of fish, including sharks, would result in a shift
away from utilization and begin the path toward a trade ban.186
At CoP9, the parties began efforts to gain more information about
sharks and to encourage other bodies charged with managing fisheries to
do the same.187 This resulted in additional data, and began a process of
186.
This debate has some interesting implications for the discussion in this Article,
since positions that CITES is not the right forum are often tied to the view that CITES listing
should be a last resort and limited to proven threats from trade. This means, in turn, that
those who have argued against bringing sharks under the auspices of CITES often do not
regard CITES listing as a precautionary measure. See, e.g., CITES Mgmt. Auth. of the People’s Republic of China, “Sharks” and COP12 – A Case for Caution, 12th Meeting of the
Conf. of the Parties, Nov. 3-5, 2002, at 2–3, CoP12 Inf. 30 (2002), available at http://cites.org/
sites/default/files/eng/cop/12/inf/E12i-30.PDF.
187.
IUCN SPECIES SURVIVAL COMMISSION’S SHARK SPECIALIST GROUP AND TRAFFIC, THE ROLE OF CITES IN THE CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT OF SHARKS 1 (2002),
available at http://cites.org/sites/default/files/common/notif/2002/ESF042A.pdf; CITES, 12th
Meeting of the Conf. of the Parties, Santiago, Chile, Nov. 3-5, 2002, Conservation and Management of Sharks, 2, CoP12 Doc. 41.1 [hereinafter Conservation and Management of
Sharks], available at http://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/cop/12/doc/E12-41-1.pdf.
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monitoring and reporting on progress in shark fisheries management by
the CITES Animals Committee.188 Nevertheless, by 2002, there was a
sense that shark fishing states had made insufficient progress in developing
international plans of action with the FAO and some states began to want
more action. Australia and the United Kingdom each listed a species of
shark on Appendix III, allowing them to monitor trade through their own
export permits.189
At subsequent CoPs, certain shark species were proposed for listing
and ultimately listed. However, these listing votes have been consistently
close, often taken in Committee, with debates then opened at the plenary
session of the CoP. This Section gives some detail on various shark-listing
proposals to shed some light into the parties’ approach to listing these
sharks.
In 2002, two shark species were listed on Appendix II after close
votes. Arguments were raised in debate that the proposals for listing had
not met Appendix II criteria. In Committee I discussion, the listing proposals for the whale shark (Rhincodon typus) and the basking shark
(Cetorinhus maximus) were first rejected by the parties, not receiving the
required two-thirds majority vote. In plenary session, the votes were reopened in the form of opening debate at plenary. With additional parties
voting, the two-thirds majority was reached.190 In addition, a simple majority of the parties voted in favor of CoP Resolution 12.6, continuing the
process of finding ways to gather more biological and trade information
about sharks.191
In attempts to list certain shark species since 2002, proposals have
been consistent in acknowledging the lack of data for shark species, but
inconsistent in whether or not they invoke precaution. Only one more
shark species was listed on Appendix II in the years between 2002 and
2013, the great white shark (Carcharodon carcharias). In its proposal for
listing the great white shark, Australia invoked the need for “precautionary measures” and proposed a zero annual export quota. Indeed, Australia
had originally sought range state input on the possibility of Appendix I
188.
THE ROLE
supra note 187, at 1.
189.

OF

CITES

IN THE

CONSERVATION

AND

MANAGEMENT

OF

SHARKS,

Conservation and Management of Sharks, supra note 187, at 3.

190.
Proposals to list these two shark species were initially rejected in Committee I, but
accepted after debate was reopened in plenary session. CITES, 12th Meeting of the Conf. of
the Parties, Plen. mtg., Santiago, Chile, Nov. 3–15, 2002, Rep. on its 9th Sess., at 2–3, CoP12
Plen. 9, Nov. 15, 2002 (reporting re-opening of the proposals to list the basking shark and
whale shark on Appendix II and acceptance of those proposals at plenary session); CITES,
12th Meeting of the Conf. of the Parties, Comm. I mtg., Santiago, Chile, Nov. 3–15, 2002,
Rep. on 11th Sess., at 3, CoP12 Com. 1 Rep. 11 (Rev.), Nov. 12, 2002 (reporting the rejection
of a proposal to list the whale shark on Appendix II); CITES, 12th Meeting of the Conf. of
the Parties, Comm. I mtg., Santiago, Chile, Nov. 5–13, 2002, Rep. on its 12th Session, at 2,
CoP12 Com. I Rep. 12 (Rev.) Nov. 13, 2002 [hereinafter Comm. I Mtg., 12th Session] (reporting the rejection of a proposal to list the basking shark on Appendix II).
191.
Comm I. Mtg., 12th Session, supra note 190, at 3 (reporting acceptance of Resolution 12.6 after a vote, with a simple majority).
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listing, but had not received full support for Appendix I listing by other
range states. Australia did not dwell on precaution, however, focusing instead on both the lack of full data and the evidence from existing data that
populations were declining significantly to argue that an Appendix II listing “would help ensure that exploitation of this globally threatened species
is regulated and monitored and that international trade is not detrimental
to its survival.”192 The precaution seems to be embedded within the desire
for listing.
At CoP15 in 2010, additional shark species were proposed for listing:
the oceanic whitetip shark (Carcharhinus longimanus), the scalloped hammerhead shark (Sphyrna lewini), and the porbeagle shark (Lamna
nasus).193 Although a simple majority of parties voted in favor of listing,
the two-thirds majority required for listing was not achieved. Many states
talked about the need for management and regulation of the trade, arguing that listing on Appendix II would allow for collection of data.194
Speaking about the hammerhead shark, Brazil noted that an Appendix-II
listing “would provide an important tool for the sustainable management
of sharks that were naturally vulnerable to overexploitation.”195 All those
in favor also argued that the proposals met scientific evidence requirements.196 Only the proposal to list the porbeagle shark referred to precaution, noting that countries would have to implement precautionary and
conservation measures.197 None of the proposals relied heavily on precaution as a supporting factor for listing, even though information gaps were
192.
CITES, 13th Conf. of the Parties, Bangkok, Thai., Oct. 2–14, 2004, Consideration
of Proposals for Amendment of Appendices I and II, 1, CoP13 Prop. 32 (2004) (proposal to
include Carcharodon carcharias in Appendix II with a zero annual export quota).
193.
CITES, 16th Conf. of the Parties, Bangkok, Thai., Mar. 3–14, 2013, Proposals for
Amendment of Appendix I and II, CoP16 Props. 42-44 (2013).
194.
CITES, 15th Meeting of the Conf. of the Parties, Comm. I mtg., Doha, Qatar, Mar.
13–25, 2010, Summary Rec. of 13th Sess., at 2, CoP15 Com. I Rec. 13 (Rev. 2), Mar 23, 2010
[hereinafter 13th Sess. Comm. I mtg.]; id. at 4 (reporting that Spain, arguing on behalf of the
EU for a listing of the oceanic whitetip shark, noted that since historical data was lacking,
now would be the time to start collecting data). CITES, 15th Meeting of the Conf. of the
Parties, Comm. I mtg., Doha, Qatar, Mar. 13–25, 2010, Rep. on its 14th Sess., CoP15 Com. I
Rec. 14 (Rev. 2), Mar. 23, 2010 [hereinafter 14th Sess., Comm. I mtg.] (reporting that Canada
argued that listing the porbeagle shark would assist international conservation efforts “by
providing data on management and harvesting”).
195.
13th Sess., Comm. I mtg., supra note 194, at 2; see also id. (reporting that Norway
noted that Appendix II listing could “improve controls along the commodity chain”).
196.

Id.

197.
CITES, 15th Meeting of the Conf. of the Parties, Doha, Qatar, Mar. 13–25, 2010,
Consideration of Proposals for Amendment of Appendices I and II, 13, CoP15 Prop. 17 (2010)
(proposal for inclusion of Lamna nasus). See also CITES, 15th Meeting of the Conf. of the
Parties, Doha, Qatar, Mar. 13–25, 2010, Consideration of Proposals for Amendment of Appendices I and II, CoP15 Prop. 15 (2010) (proposal for inclusion of Sphyrna lewini), and
CITES, 15th Meeting of the Conf. of the Parties, Doha, Qatar, Mar. 13–25, 2010, Consideration of Proposals for Amendment of Appendices I and II, CoP15 Prop. 16 (2010) (proposal
for inclusion of Carcharhinus longimanus).
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acknowledged and some evidence existed of severely declining shark
stocks.
Indeed, those opposing the listings in 2010 primarily stressed the lack
of data about the species and concerns about the lack of capacity to implement the requirements of an Appendix II listing, particularly with regard
to non-detriment findings.198 Although others refuted the idea that nondetriment findings could not be made for sharks, and the U.S. agreed to a
24-month implementation delay and committed to supporting capacitybuilding activities, this was not enough to persuade several parties.199
Rather than favoring listing on Appendix II as a means of generating data
and building capacity, Japan for example, commented that conservation of
the scalloped hammerhead shark “would be best addressed through improved enforcement efforts rather than by an Appendix-II listing.”200
Enough parties were convinced of the need for listing of the porbeagle
shark that it achieved a two-thirds majority at the Committee stage of discussion and voting.201 However, the other shark listing proposals were rejected and the porbeagle shark proposal was reopened in plenary session
and rejected at that point.202 Meanwhile, the parties made revisions to
198.
13th Sess., Comm. I mtg., supra note 194, at 2–3 (reporting comments by Japan,
China, Cuba, Saint Lucia, Guinea Bissau, and Indonesia discussing lack of sufficient scientific
data to support the proposal for listing the scalloped hammerhead shark (Sphyrna lewini) on
Appendix II and difficulties of implementation); Id. at 4-5 (reporting comments by Chile,
China, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, and Vietnam expressing concerns about lack of scientific data and implementation problems in opposing the proposal to list the oceanic whitetip shark (Carcharhinus longimanus) in
Appendix II). See also CITES, 15th Meeting of the Conf. of the Parties, Comm. I mtg., Doha,
Qatar, Mar. 13–25, 2010, Summary Rec. of the 4th Sess., at 3, CoP 15 Com. I Rec. 4 (Rev. 1),
Mar. 16, 2010 (reporting that China and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya expressed concern
about adopting decisions regarding sharks based on incomplete data); Id. at 4 (reporting that
the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya “disagreed with the logic of protecting endangered species
before management tools had been developed”); 14th Sess., Comm. I mtg., supra note 191, at
2 (reporting that China and Cambodia worried about the difficulties of implementing an
Appendix II-listing of the porbeagle shark).
199.
13th Sess., Comm. I mtg., supra note 194, at 2 (reporting that Australia invoked the
work of the non-detriment finding workshop held in Mexico in 2008 that had found that
issuing non-detriment findings for shark species would be possible). See also CITES, CITES
Non-Detriment Findings Guidance for Shark Species, 27th Meeting of the Animals Comm.,
Apr. 28 – May 3, 2014, AC27 Inf.1 (2014), available at http://cites.org/sites/default/files/common/com/ac/27/E-AC27-Inf-01.pdf. See CITES, 15th Meeting of the Conf. of the Parties,
Doha, Qatar, Mar. 13-25, 2010, Conservation and Management of Sharks and Stingrays, 13,
CoP15 Doc. 53, available at http://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/cop/15/doc/E15-53.pdf; 14th
Sess,. Comm I mtg., supra note 194, at 2 (reporting that an expert at the meeting clarified
that identification of the various shark species was possible). 13th Sess., Comm. I mtg., supra
note 192, at 3, 4 (reporting the U.S. agreeing to an extension of the implementation delay in
response to a request by the United Arab Emirates).
200.

13th Sess., Comm. I mtg, supra note 192, at 2.

201.

14th Sess., Comm. I mtg., supra note 194, at 2.

202.
CITES, 15th Meeting of the Conf. of the Parties, Plen. Mtg., Doha, Qatar, Mar. 1325, 2010, Summary Rec. of the 6th Sess., at 2, CoP15 Plen. 6 (Rev. 1), Mar. 25, 2010.
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Resolution 12.6 to encourage the parties to increase data collection and
information gathering activities.203
These same shark species were proposed for listing on Appendix II
again at CoP16, this time resulting in listing.204 Amendments were also
made again to Resolution 12.6, ensuring continued data gathering and
monitoring.205 Again, the proposals did not refer to precaution, even
though they acknowledged some lack of data. This time, the proposals for
listing made clear that sufficient data existed to support listing, so that
even if some information was lacking, the data presented came from the
“best available scientific study.”206 In a document addressing potential frequently asked questions on the porbeagle listing proposal, one question
explicitly addressed the difference between the proposal for listing at
CoP16 and the proposal for listing at CoP15 in 2010 by touting the availability of new information to support listing-fisheries management information, new catch and trade data, and re-evaluation of available trend
data.207 This time, the proposals passed by the required two-thirds majority, although the votes were close. They were re-opened at plenary session,
but the listing decisions remained. By 2013, it seems, the parties felt they
had sufficient information to meet the threshold required for listing.
2. Polar Bear
The polar bear (Ursus maritimus) has been listed on Appendix II of
CITES since 1992. In 2010 and again in 2013, the United States proposed
transferring the polar bear to Appendix I.208 Neither attempt was successful. This Article focuses on the more robust discussion at CoP16 in 2013.
The polar bear question is unusual for CITES because the bear’s primary threat does not come from trade, but from the projected effects of
climate change.209 Further, those projected effects are not yet evident in
polar bear populations. As discussed above, polar bear populations may
203.
See Conservation and Management of Sharks and Stingrays, supra note 199, at 13.
204.
CITES, 16th Meeting of the Conf. of the Parties, Plen. mtg., Bangkok, Thai., Mar.
3-14, 2013, Summary Rec. of its 7th Sess., CoP16 Plen. 7 (Rev. 1), Mar. 14, 2013, available at
http://cites.org/sites/default/files/common/cop/16/sum/E-CoP16-Plen-07.pdf.
205.
CITES, 12th Meeting of the Conf. of the Parties, Santiago, Chile, Nov. 3-15, 2002,
Conservation and Management of Sharks, Conf. Res. 12.6 (Rev. CoP16), available at http://
cites.org/eng/res/12/12-06R16.php.
206.
CITES, Oceanic Whitetip Proposal Additional Supporting Scientific Information,
16th Meeting of the Conf. of the Parties, Mar. 3–14, 2013, CoP16 Inf. 26 (2013), available at
http://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/cop/16/inf/E-CoP16i-26.pdf.
207.
CITES, Fact Sheet and FAQ Paper on the Porbeagle Listing Proposal, 16th Meeting of the Conf. of the Parties, Mar. 3–14, 2013, 2 at question 3, CoP16 Inf.29 (2013), available at http://cites.org/sites/default/files//eng/cop/16/inf/E-CoP16i-29.pdf.
208.
CITES, 15th Meeting of the Conf. of the Parties, Bangkok, Thai., Mar. 13-25, 2010,
Consideration of Proposals for Amendment of Appendices I and II, CoP15 Prop. 3 (2010);
CITES, 16th Meeting of the Conf. of the Parties, Bangkok, Thai., Mar. 3–14, 2013, Consideration of Proposals for Amendment of Appendices I and II, CoP16 Prop. 3 (2013) [hereinafter
Polar Bear Proposal].
209.
See discussion supra notes 40–40 & 60–61 and accompanying text.
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not currently be in decline, but climate scientists’ projections of sea ice loss
will, polar bear scientists predict, have an impact on populations. Thus,
through modeling, scientists predict polar bear populations declining
throughout the next decades, with some projecting polar bear extinction
within around forty-five years. Yet, this scientific consensus is contested by
some Inuit communities, who question scientific estimates of the number
of polar bears, as well as disputing how adaptable polar bears will be in the
face of climate change.210
At CoP16, the proposal to up-list the polar bear from Appendix II to
Appendix I acknowledged that polar bear populations were not currently
in decline and, to support up-listing, discussed inferred and projected declines in population due to sea-ice loss and the concern that commercial
hunting could exacerbate problems caused by that sea-ice loss.211 In order
to satisfy the biological listing criteria, the proposal referred to the basis
for listing as being a “marked decline in the population size in the wild,
which has been inferred or projected on the basis of a decrease in area of
habitat and a decrease in quality of habitat.”212 The proposal also stated
that although some polar bear harvesting occurs for primarily subsistence
purposes, a substantial number of polar bears were exported or re-exported, about half of the total number harvested.213
In addition to addressing the likely effect of predictions of sea-ice loss,
the proposal addressed the relationship among the various activities and
threats.214 In particular, the proposal discussed the compounding effect of
sea-ice loss leading to polar bears having to spend more time on land.215
This additional time on land could make the bears more susceptible to
hunting because they would be spending more time closer to human
habitation-partly due to sea-ice loss and partly due to their need to supplement their diet, which they often do by scavenging around human
settlements.
Arguing that the projected decrease in habitat exacerbates all other
potential threats, the proposal explicitly invoked the need for a precautionary approach “to ensure that primarily commercial trade does not
compound the threats posed to the species by loss of habitat.”216 The pro210.
See Martina Tyrrell, West Hudson Bay Polar Bears, supra note 59, at 95, 98–101
(describing the view of Arviarmiut that polar bear numbers are increasing); Government of
Nunavut, Response to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s Proposed Rule to List the Polar
Bear as Threatened Throughout its Range, in INUIT, POLAR BEARS AND SUSTAINABLE USE:
LOCAL, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 59, at 153, 155–61 (questioning the methodology and conclusions of scientific studies that have projected that polar
bears will be endangered or extinct within three generations due to climate-induced reduction in sea ice).
211.

Polar Bear Proposal, supra note 208, at 2.

212.

Id. at 1.

213.

Id. at 2.

214.

Id. at 6.

215.

Id. at 2.

216.

Id.
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posal also explicitly addressed the lack of information for most polar bear
populations.217
In response, Denmark, speaking on behalf of Greenland, opposed the
proposal.218 Denmark’s contribution to the discussion, as recorded in the
summary of the meeting, is of particular interest: “[Denmark, on behalf of
Greenland] considered that proposals should be based on unequivocal scientific evidence. It did not consider the proposal met the criteria for transfer to Appendix I and believed there would be a risk to the credibility of
CITES if it were accepted.”219 The opposition to the listing argued that
harvesting was not market-driven; in other words, harvesting was part of
conservation efforts not driven by a desire for consumption.220 Countries
also highlighted the fact that the primary threat was due to climate change,
not hunting.221 The parties generally acknowledged this; they just didn’t
agree on what to do about it.
Ireland, acting on behalf of the European Union and Croatia, then
made an unusual move. In an attempt to find some middle ground, Ireland
proposed an amendment to the Proposal that would have maintained the
polar bear on Appendix II with the addition of export quotas and reporting obligations to the Animals Committee and the CITES Secretariat. The
amendment would also have placed polar bears in the Significant Trade
Review process.222 The polar bear range states were split on whether they
supported this amendment.223
The debate suggests that the parties did not know what to do about
uncertainty, or did not want to wrestle with it. While the proposal itself
explicitly invoked the precautionary approach, those states opposing the
proposal did not refer to precaution, but instead referred to the absence of
conclusive evidence and noted that the proposal did not fit with the biological criteria of the listing criteria.224 The IUCN flagged the uncertainty
and the criteria’s lack of a means to address it, but the parties did not take
up the issue explicitly. The summary of IUCN’s response is worth quoting
in full:
IUCN stressed that forecasts of future declines in polar bear
populations were based on uncertain models of the future habitat
217.
Id. at 5.
218.
CITES, 16th Meeting of the Conf. of the Parties, Plen. mtg., Bangkok, Thai., Mar.
3–14, 2013, Summary Rec. of its 6th Sess., at 2, CoP16 Com I. Rec. 6 (Rev. 1), Mar. 13, 2013
[hereinafter 16th Sess. plen. mtg.]. Denmark was supported by Canada, Iceland, Japan and
South Africa. Id.
219.
Id.
220.
Id. This view was contested by proponents of the proposal.
221.
Id. (discussing Denmark’s comments on the proposal to not add the polar bear to
Appendix I); Id. at 3 (quoting the provision of Ireland’s proposed amendment that noted that
“polar bears are primarily threatened by climate change and the associat7d loss of Arctic sea
ice”); see also Polar Bear Proposal, supra note 208.
222.
See 16th Sess. plen. mtg., supra note 218 at 3.
223.
Id.
224.
Id. at 2, 4.
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of the species, and noted that the guidelines for assessing proposals in [the listing criteria] did not explicitly address the time period
over which projected future declines should be considered in the
context of the biological criteria for inclusion in Appendix I. It
urged the Parties to clarify this in any future revision of the Resolution, regardless of the outcome of the present proposal.
The IUCN’s point is well taken. The criteria address a five to ten year
time period, while the projections being offered by the U.S. proposal,
drawing on scientific projections, covered a far longer time span.
Neither proposal passed. The EU’s proposal fared better than the US
proposal, but probably only because the EU did not abstain on it as they
did for the US proposal, accounting for several of the votes. Although a
large reason for the difference in voting records was the fact that the EU
voted for its own proposal, but abstained on the US proposal, the fact that
it was proposed and received some support suggests something interesting.
For some parties, recognition of uncertainty may not be enough to justify
listing, but will be enough to justify additional study. The coda to the listing discussion supports this view. At the 27th Meeting of the Animals
Committee in 2014, the UK put the polar bear into the Significant Trade
Review process. Thus, more research is likely to be pursued.
Of course, the story of the polar bear listing proposal is different from
the story of the sharks, because the polar bear was already listed on Appendix II, allowing for monitoring and enhanced information. Its listing on
Appendix II is what allows it to be placed in the Significant Trade Review
process. However, the story also tells us something interesting about how
the parties appear to approach precaution. First, as with the sharks, lack of
data is seen as a reason not to list or up-list, rather than a reason to list as a
precautionary measure. Second, the parties are unwilling to expand their
definition of precaution to encompass precautionary measures to address
a species in decline from a variety of sources, where trade may not be its
primary threat but could exacerbate a different threat. In this sense, the
parties did not fully grapple with the explicit reference to the variables at
play in the U.S. proposal for up-listing.
3. Elephants, MIKE, and Ivory Sales
In 1989, the up-listing of the African elephant (Loxodonta africana)
from Appendix II to Appendix I was not universally supported by the
African range states. Southern African states, opposed to the up-listing
and accompanying ban on commercial ivory trade, argued that their populations were well managed and that removing the possibility of allowing
sale of ivory stockpiles from, among other things, culling operations that
were part of conservation activity, would deprive these countries of a
needed source of income.225 The east African states, by contrast, wanted
to end the market in ivory, having watched their elephant populations
225.
See RAYMOND BONNER, AT
WILDLIFE (1994).
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crash due to poaching. The question of trade in ivory invokes values that
go beyond simply how many elephants there are. Some argue that no killing should be allowed of these animals. Others observe that elephants are
not as popular among local communities who live with them as they are
among people living far away.226 Tensions run high.
Despite these value differences, the debates that have dogged CITES
for years generally invoke the data about elephant populations and ivory
trade, rather than invoking values. Within these data discussions, there is
also recognition of significant uncertainty, ranging from information gaps
to uncertainty surrounding socioeconomic factors such as trends in market
demand, price fluctuations, and access to weapons for poaching. The way
in which the parties have navigated this uncertainty and the underlying
value disagreements provides an interesting lesson in the role monitoring
can play in CITES and its limitations.
In 1997, the parties voted on and passed a form of compromise. Certain geographically-defined species would be down-listed to Appendix II
with zero quotas, but with provision for sales of stockpiled ivory by designated countries to designated countries. At the time the parties agreed to
down-list certain populations of the African elephant, they also established two monitoring schemes: Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants
(MIKE) and the Elephant Trade Information System (ETIS).
Two sales of ivory have occurred since then and significant resources
have been invested into MIKE. Yet, the parties are no further to agreement on whether ivory should be the subject of trade. Although MIKE is
an improvement on a situation with no resources, it is also rife with data
deficiencies and holes.227 Much information is simply unavailable because
of constraints on capacity to collect the data. Other information is available, but may not be entirely accurate. One review of MIKE, for example,
points out that methodologies of counting can themselves have an element
of choice, in turn leading to an element of uncertainty about the accuracy
of results.228 This is not to suggest that MIKE isn’t useful or that we
should expect one hundred per cent accuracy in information. It does
demonstrate, however, that perfect information is unattainable.
Most importantly, MIKE cannot—and never could—provide causal
analysis. While MIKE can give indications of elephant numbers and
whether they are stable or declining, and MIKE and other reports can
provide documentation of increased poaching, this in itself does not prove
that the increase in poaching is a result of any or all of the ivory sales, nor
can it prove that the poaching is not related to those sales. Commentators
226.

See id.

227.

See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.

228.
G.C. Craig, Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants: Aerial Survey Standards for
the MIKE Progrmame, Version 2.0, CITES, MIKE Programme, (2012) (describing the various methods for doing aerial surveys of elephant populations where the particular context
helps determine the appropriate methodology to use).
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disagree.229 Uncertainty in this context is linked the complexity of the situation, coupled with lack of complete data. Too many variables in the face
of too little complete information means there will never be certainty on
this issue. Yet prior value positions still influence how groups interpret
that data.
The parties have not responded by explicitly invoking precaution or
even seeking out full information before allowing additional sales. Instead,
they have begun the process of developing a decision-making process for
the sale of ivory, implicitly favoring process over substantive commitments
to a particular position.
E. Analysis and Conclusion
The evidence suggests that the parties to CITES implement precaution by focusing primarily on monitoring and information-gathering for
adaptive management. It is important to note that even proposals that do
not succeed can provide evidence of support for listing by many parties,
given that listing requires a two-thirds majority of the parties present and
voting. Thus, it would be a mistake to believe that a failure to list a species
or up-list a species is an indication of the majority view. However, the fact
that a vote failed at a CITES CoP can indicate that the parties do not
agree on when listing is appropriate.
Where enough information—a kind of threshold level of information—-is available to indicate a threat, it seems a two-thirds majority of
CITES parties can be attained for a proposal to list a species on Appendix
II. However, in the absence of that level of information, even Appendix II
listing may not be available, as with the three shark species at CoP 15.
Further, where sufficient information exists for the parties to support an
Appendix II listing, yet uncertainty remains, the parties seem unwilling to
rely on Appendix I listing and a complete trade ban as a precautionary
measure. Instead, the parties have placed significant efforts and resources
into increasing monitoring to close the information gap before supporting
a complete ban. This is evident in the outcome, albeit close, of the polar
bear up-listing proposal and the continued split-listing of the African elephant and periodic sales of ivory.
Across the board, the parties to CITES prefer to invoke and support
monitoring and adaptive management approaches over precaution, rarely
invoking precaution in listing proposals or discussions. Where precaution
is invoked, it does not appear to have persuasive effect on the parties’
votes. The listing criteria themselves, although they are the only instance
of explicit reference to the precautionary approach, define that precautionary approach by reference to monitoring and adaptive responses. In
229.
See, e.g., E.H. Bulte, R. Damania & G.C. van Kooten, The Effects of One-off Ivory
Sales on Elephant Mortality, 71 HUMAN DIMENSIONS OF WILDLIFE MGMT. 613 (2007); D.
Biggs, F. Courchamp, R. Martin & H.P. Possingham, Legal Trade of Africa’s Rhino Horns,
339 SCI. 1038, 1039 (2013); ENVIRONMENTAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY [EIA], STOP STIMULATING DEMAND!: LET WILDLIFE TRADE BANS WORK (2013), available at http://eia-interna
tional.org/stop-simulating-demand-report.
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addition, the recent guidance CoP Resolution on Non-Detriment Findings
abandoned the expert workshop’s references to precaution in its text, but
explicitly endorsed adaptive management and monitoring.
Thus, to the extent that the parties to CITES are willing to acknowledge precaution or a precautionary approach, they do so in a way that will
limit its role to one primarily of monitoring and information gathering.
The concrete examples of debates about species reinforce this view that
many parties are more comfortable pushing for increased monitoring than
they are supporting additional listing.
IV. A DUAL ROLE FOR PRECAUTION IN WILDLIFE TRADE:
PROCEDURE AND SUBSTANCE
The emphasis described above on monitoring and adaptive management as means of implementing precaution suggests that the parties to
CITES have a particular and narrow view of uncertainty. The primary focus of the parties appears to be on data gaps, treated as largely temporary.
Even where they are not temporary, in that one hundred percent complete
data is impossible, the suggestion is that enough data can give rise to sufficient levels of certainty to inform decisions using modeling and
extrapolations.
What is missing is engagement with the levels of uncertainty and complexity that go beyond past or current data gaps. The uncertainty surrounding these particular debates—and debates about wildlife trade more
generally—is not only uncertainty related to data gaps that can be remedied with more research, as discussed in Part II above. Even if capacity
problems could be fully resolved, the kind of capacity problems that currently plague MIKE and non-detriment findings, uncertainty persists because of the lack of historical baseline data, complexity and variables, and
the lack of a fixed equilibrium that can provide a template to guide action.
This response of the parties to rely on monitoring and adaptive management is necessary for management of wildlife trade. However, this approach is not sufficient. In part because of the deep uncertainty, and in
part because of the nature of scientific conclusions, science and more data
cannot fully resolve the questions that face the parties to CITES, even
though it is a critical component of decision-making. The contested discussions about polar bears, sharks, and ivory all demonstrate that science
does not give one clear answer to the parties about what to do. When this
uncertainty is overlaid with the different values at play, the science becomes more contested and it becomes even more difficult to base decisionmaking entirely on science.
Yet the fears that have motivated many commentators and parties to
turn away from explicit references to the precautionary principle or approach are real. If decision-making is seen as counter to the science, or in
spite of the science, it begins to seem unanchored and lacking any grounding in conservation. This in turn raises the very real concern that conservation efforts could fail and the consequences be worse than if no action had
been taken at all. This Article’s two-prong approach to precaution that can
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be applied to decision-making by the parties to CITES both at CoPs and
in national implementation of CITES navigates this concern and attempts
to root decisions in science, while recognizing the limits of science and the
need for transparency at the point that science can no longer provide the
answer.
This Part first addresses the way in which precaution can play a role in
adaptive management and monitoring, a procedural role.230 It goes on to
outline a substantive role for precaution to supplement this procedural
role.
A. Precaution in Adaptive Management: A Procedural Role
Precaution is critical as part of monitoring and adaptive management.
Indeed, precaution is part of monitoring, allowing us to ensure, as
Doremus says, that we are “learning while doing.”231 Acknowledging different types of uncertainty, Cooney proposes turning to adaptive management principles such as incremental action, constant monitoring, feedback,
and an ability to adjust conservation measures in the face of new information as a means of implementing precaution in biodiversity
conservation.232
This is a procedural role for precaution. This procedural role is not
just a checklist, but requires deep understanding of the uncertainties that
inform scientific decision making. In this context, precaution plays more
than one role. It can ensure that the type of experimentation and action
taken is not likely to lead to irreversible consequences, such as extinction,
but is intended to promote learning.233 It also ensures that scientific
processes and the uncertainties inherent in them are made explicit.234 In
turn, this might lead to decision makers seeking out additional sources of
information,235 and ensuring full and transparent debate.236 Precaution in
this context could also serve to encourage decision makers to develop triggers that will allow for responses if unforeseen, harmful consequences result from a particular decision.237 In advance of decisions, this form of
precaution can also be incorporated into forms of environmental impact
assessment, allowing decision makers conducting impact assessments to
230.
See also Wiersema, Adversaries or Partners?, supra note 144, at 230–31, 235 (arguing for a dual role for the precautionary principle in wildlife conservation treaties).
231.

Doremus, Precaution, Science, and Learning, supra note 17, at 550.
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See Rosie Cooney, The Precautionary Principle in Biodiversity Conservation and
Natural Resource Management: An Issues Paper for Policy-Makers, Researchers, and Practitioners, IUCN POL’Y & GLOBAL CHANGE SERIES, no. 2, 2004, at 26–27, available at https://
portals.iucn.org/library/efiles/documents/PGC-002.pdf.
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address uncertainty and engage with it.238 Indeed, for some commentators, well-implemented adaptive management will be sufficiently precautionary for most situations.239
In this, the parties to CITES are performing well, but they could do
more. To promote the precautionary elements of adaptive management
and the role that monitoring can play in avoiding extinction, the parties
should explicitly discuss precaution as an aspect of that monitoring and
adaptive management. In addition, the parties should be explicit about the
layers of uncertainty with which they are grappling. Specifically, maintaining the role of the precautionary approach in the listing criteria as it currently appears is critical. Further, in guidance on non-detriment findings,
and in implementing that guidance, the parties could draw explicitly on the
work of the expert workshop on non-detriment findings. There, experts
repeatedly acknowledged a role for precaution even as they urged adaptive management and monitoring. If the parties explicitly acknowledged
precaution, it is more likely that the precautionary elements of adaptive
management would be implemented by those parties’ Management and
Scientific Authorities.
Precaution as part of procedure could also play a more explicit role in
the listing debates. Listing is a tool that allows for monitoring. Thus the
absence of threshold data should not be seen as a reason to exclude species from Appendix II listing or even a trade ban through Appendix I
listing. Further, recognition of scientific uncertainty and complexity as part
of adaptive management should allow the parties to take uncertainty into
account in their evaluation of the predictions about the effect of trade on
markets, accounting for variables and the interaction of different threats.
Nevertheless, procedural approaches can only address uncertainty
where new information that can resolve that uncertainty can be obtained.
To address other forms of uncertainty, adaptive management and monitoring will be insufficient.
B.

Precaution as a Substantive Decision-Making Tool

Adaptive management alone for the implementation of precaution
and navigation of uncertainty is necessary, but not sufficient to ensure
CITES’ goals are met. Even those in favor of limiting precaution to adaptive management acknowledge that where risks are high, the calculations
may be different. Rabinovich, for example, despite advocating for sustainable trade for some species, says that “[t]otal bans are not necessary, except in cases where a species is in a serious threat category (for example
endangered or critically endangered), or when it plays an important role in
238.
See TUCKER & TREWEEK, supra note 92, at 88 (describing the fact that impact
assessment is “routinely constrained” by scientific uncertainty, but that environmental impact
guidelines and regulations have very little on “dealing with uncertainty and the appropriate
use of the precautionary principle in such circumstances”).
239.
See, e.g., Rabinovich, supra note 237, at 186; Stephen P. Mealey et al., Precaution
in the American Endangered Species Act: A Precursor to Environmental Design, in BIODIVERSITY AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note 83, at 189, 200.
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a complex ecological situation, and when the degree of uncertainty is very
high and ecological relationships are poorly understood.”240
Adaptive management does not on its own reverse any burden of
proof, or provide a value judgment about the risks the parties should be
willing to bear. The procedural, adaptive management version of precaution is preventative, but not quite fully precautionary.241 It does not fully
account for the fact that even if precaution is implemented within scientific processes, science still leaves policy decision makers with uncertainty.
Indeed, following the approach the parties to CITES have followed,
relying on monitoring and preferring science-based decision-making has
not removed the value choices at play. Decisions about wildlife trade involve values as well as data. Some of these values are explicit in CITES
decision-making, others are less explicitly acknowledged, but nevertheless
inform decisions.
Values that are both explicit and implicit are cultural and personal
beliefs about the appropriateness of utilization or consumption of species.
This has played out most overtly in the context of charismatic megafauna
and iconic species, such as elephants. The debate centers around how significantly conservation strategies should rely on sustainable utilization.
Some participants in the debate are also informed by what we might traditionally regard as animal rights perspectives. These add moral concerns
about cruelty and killing of other species to questions about whether species should be captive-bred, culled, ranched, and killed for their parts even
if done sustainably.
Less explicit, but nevertheless real, are political concerns that inform
decisions about listing. These can include reputational concerns and concerns about participation in other fora. This can operate either in favor of
listing and limiting trade or against it. In response, the parties have had
extensive debates about the proper role of secret ballots in listing votes.242
For many commentators, the reality of these value conflicts reinforce
the view that decision-making should be based solely on science. This may
be one reason why the parties have shied away from invoking precaution
as a basis for listing. Under this view, where uncertainty arises, it should be
corrected with additional monitoring and adaptive management
techniques.
However, if scientists cannot resolve value preferences, and additional
monitoring and adaptive management cannot lead us to complete certainty, the value and political conflicts will remain. Decision-making cannot avoid having to grapple with uncertainty.
At this stage of decision-making, precaution can play a role without
undermining the input of scientists and objective criteria. The parties to
CITES can be guided both by the underlying substantive message of the
240.
Rabinovich, supra note 239, at 186.
241.
See Trouwborst, supra note 80, at 118.
242.
Summary of the Sixteenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora: 3–14 March
2013, 21 EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL. 1, 3–4 (2013).
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precautionary principle or precautionary approach, avoidance of serious
and irreversible environmental consequences, and by the substantive goal
of CITES itself, ensuring that species do not go extinct as a result of international trade.
In its simplest application, this could lead to simply allowing more listing, which in turn allows for more data gathering and monitoring as well as
putting in place a substantive precautionary buffer. This is not quite
enough, however. Simply favoring listing alone, for example, does not address what the parties should do with regard to impacts on species that do
not arise directly from trade, but may nevertheless interact with trade to
produce an unintended and harmful consequence for a species survival.
This is true for the polar bear, threatened primarily by climate change.
A more nuanced and appropriate way to apply precaution in substantive decision-making would not simply favor listing without more, but
would allow listing to play a role in a strategy that could account of all
sources of uncertainty. In the case of whether to ban trade or allow even
restricted legal trade, acknowledging the full range of relevant biological
and socio-economic uncertainties calls for the application of precaution.
This can be implemented by listing species and supplementing that listing
by placing resources into approaches that have been only partly tried to
date, like increased enforcement, domestic trade bans, and demand reduction campaigns. Listing and trade bans can also provide time for the procedural aspects of precaution to be implemented with adaptive management
and monitoring. In this sense, the substantive and procedural roles for precaution work together.
This approach to precaution is substantive because it requires the parties to take the scientific information they have and make a decision about
what to do. This decision must be informed by that science and also by
recognition of uncertainty and the need for precaution in pursuit of
CITES’s goal of avoiding extinction due to international trade.
In the case of ivory, and in upcoming debates about rhino horn, this
means that until more information is available, the parties should oppose
allowing trade while they grapple with the uncertainty involved, rather
than favoring more trade until proven wrong. This approach would also
change how the parties approached the shark species debates. Instead of
waiting until more information—even at a threshold level—became available before listing on Appendix II, the parties could have recognized the
multiple sources of uncertainty and used precaution to justify listing. This
would in turn have begun the process of protection while the parties gathered more information, serving both the procedural and substantive roles
of the precautionary approach.
For the polar bear, recognizing uncertainty in all its dimensions means
recognizing that some information will not be obtainable and that variables could interact in unforeseeable ways. Thus, it is not enough for the
parties to consider only the direct impact of commercial hunting on polar
bear numbers, because the variables could play out in a way that leads
both trade and climate change to result in population decline. Acknowl-
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edging uncertainty requires moving away from narrow compartmentalization of the environment.
Ultimately, this approach creates a presumption in favor of listing for
species that are threatened, even if trade is not the most direct cause of
that threat. This is a modified way of reversing the burden of proof. The
presumption is consistent with the mandate of CITES.243 The text of
CITES itself sets out the irreversible harm that is to be avoided and demands of the parties that they avoid that harm. A presumption in favor of
listing would ensure that where the parties seek to allow trade in a species
that is threatened, the parties should be asking for more proof that allowing trade will not result in irreversible consequences. Where parties are
seeking to list a species to allow for more information gathering and even
interim protection, the requirement for proof of the impacts of trade on
species should be lesser because of the application of precaution and the
need to recognize multiple sources of uncertainty.
This application of precaution does not undermine science. Instead, it
draws heavily on science and the lessons of ecology to ensure that decision-making accounts fully for all sources of uncertainty.
CONCLUSION
Wildlife trade is big business and rife with uncertainty. This Article
evaluates how the parties to CITES have navigated this uncertainty. It
concludes that the parties have relied on monitoring and adaptive management to implement a form of precaution. As part of this approach, to
counteract the effects of uncertainty and the value debates that arise in
this context, the parties to CITES have sought to rely on science-based
decision-making to minimize—or perhaps hide—their disagreements.
They have shied away from expressly relying on precaution as a tool to
manage uncertainty and have not, therefore, fully engaged with deeper
layers of uncertainty. The result is a necessary but insufficient implementation of precaution.
The Article suggests two responses. First, the parties should continue
to promote monitoring, information gathering, and adaptive management,
being more explicit about the need for precaution in implementing those
strategies. Second, they should recognize the limits of this procedural role
for precaution and supplement it with a substantive role that favors listing
as a precautionary measure where a species is threatened, even if that species is threatened by many factors in addition to trade. While not everyone
believes listing is itself precautionary, this Article takes the view that listing can serve a precautionary function. It can do this by allowing both
increased monitoring and a slowdown of trade while parties pursue other
strategies and determine what they can learn. This approach is not counter
243.
See also Ed Couzens, CITES at 40: Never Too Late to Make Lifestyle Changes, 22
REV. EUR., COMP. & INT’L ENVTL. L. 311 (2013) (proposing a system in CITES that would
whitelist all species and require delisting for any trade, thereby completely reversing the burden of proof).

424

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 36:375

to science, but consistent with it, complementing science with both procedural and substantive precaution. Within CITES, listing is the tool that can
allow both of these roles for precaution.

